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ABSTRACT 
Content providers, service providers and telecom operators in China digital music market 
compete expanding to upstream and downstream channel resource. The fierce channel 
competition between participants has impede user service level and the development of 
digital music market. This paper researches into two questions. The first one is how the 
participants compete in four different competitive channel modes, in which revenue and 
service level are influenced. The second one is how participants can optimize revenue in 
coordination rather than competition. 
 
To answer to first question, firstly the participants, digital music service modes and 
channel modes are analyzed. Then considering the service level provided by telecom 
operator and service provider, two-partite and three-partite Stackelberg models are 
constructed to explore the four competitive modes, which are High Price without Service 
Provider (SP) Mode, “Low Price+Shared Revenue” without SP Mode, High Price with 
SP participation Mode and “Low Price+Shared Revenue” with SP participation Mode. 
Besides, optimal strategies in four modes are calculated and numerical analysis approach 
is adopted to explore the influence of different factors on the equilibrium results, which 
are digital music service production cost coefficient, revenue sharing ratio, user price 
sensitive factor and user service level sensitive factor. 
 
To find out solution to the second question, cooperative channel without SP participation 
mode and cooperative channel with SP participation mode are built to maximum the 
revenue of digital music channel participants. Finally two-partite and three-partite 
revenue sharing mechanisms basing on the participants’ bargaining power are explored 
to achieve the optimal channel system revenue. 
 
This study finds that in the four competitive digital music channel modes, the participants 
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competing with each other leads to revenue loss. Whether SP participates, digital music 
channel participants revenue and system revenue in High Price Mode are better than those 
in “Low Price+Shared Revenue” Mode. The optimal competitive mode is High Price 
without SP Participation Mode. To achieve channel coordination, if without SP 
participating, Telecom Operator (OP) and Content Provider (CP) formulate contract 
according to proportion  to share revenue, otherwise CP, SP and OP share 
revenue according to proportion , . 
Key words: digital music, channel modes, competition, channel coordination
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Music was at music sheet stage at 19th century and moved to records stage in the middle 
of 20th century. As the Internet technology progresses and home computer popularizes, 
music industry came to the digital age at the beginning of 21st century. Now the music 
industry is marked with both traditional physical records sales market and digital sales 
market. In the recording industry, the main property that is created and traded are 
compositions, recordings and media (such as CDs or MP3s). Performances, reproduction, 
synchronization and distribution are the main revenue sources for music publishers. 
Recordings are produced by the artists and owned by record companies, who are 
responsible for manufacturing, marketing and promoting. Media like CDs and MP3s is 
delivered by the distributors from manufacturers to retailers and money flows from 
retailers to distributors and then to recording companies. 
 
With the rapid progress of Internet and digital technology, great changes have taken place 
in the value chain and business model of music industry. Online music downloads cause 
a rapid decrease in physical records. Consumers tend to buy their favorite singles instead 
of the whole album. Digital single sales replacing bundling sales is impacting physical 
music industry. In 2007 the global recording industry’s physical music revenue accounted 
to $17.3 billion with a sharp drop of 46% in the next 5 years, while digital music is 
penetrating the music market from $3.2 billion to $5.8 billion with a compound annual 
growth rate of 12.6%. In 2012, the global digital music reached $16.5 billion with more 
than 500 authorized digital music service providers providing 30 million songs (IFPI, 
2013, pp.6). In Chinese music market, digital music revenue exceeded physical recording 
revenue in 2008, and soared into $75.8 million in 2012 while physical music revenue 
reached $16.6 million. Chinese digital music revenue increased 103% while physical 
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music dropped 62% from 2007 to 2012. The traditional music recording sales mode is 
gradually replaced by digital music business model. The boundary between different 
players in the music industry, such as artist, publisher, record company, distributor, retail 
and consumer electronics, has blurred. There are artists launching their own music studio 
to generate, distribute their own music, and big publishing companies also play the role 
of distributor and retailer. 
 
Compared with the United States and Japan, China has much bigger music listeners 
market, whereas music sales are not comparable with the music market. In 2012, Chinese 
recording industry’s digital music revenue, which came from music downloads, master 
ringtone, ringback and advertising, reached $92 million, ranking 20th of the world music 
market. According to 2012 China’s Online Music Market Annual Report issued by China 
Ministry of Culture, in 2012 Chinese digital music user scale reached 454 million and 
mobile music utilization rate accounted to 50.9% among mobile users. The authoritative 
digital music enterprises reached 575. In 2012 Chinese digital music service providers 
revenue achieved 4.54 billion RMB, among which online music revenue arrived at 1.82 
billion RMB and mobile music reached 2.72 billion RMB. However, Chinese mobile 
music total revenue achieved 31.72 billion RMB in 2012, among which telecom operators 
attained 29 billion RMB, accounting to 91% of the whole mobile music market (China 
Ministry of Culture, 2012, pp.9).  Among mobile music users, 53.7% of them got access 
to China Mobile, 26.7% got access to China Unicom and the rest 19.6% got access to 
China Telecom. According to 2012 Digital Music Report issued by International 
Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI), digital music piracy rate was as high as 
99% in Chinese market (pp.23). Lots of problems need to be settled down in Chinese 
music market, such as several recording companies and telecom operators’ monopoly, 
intense competition among music channels and severe piracy which leads to the user habit 
of getting free music resource. 
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The main participants in digital music channels contain music content providers (CP), 
service providers (SP) and telecom operators (OP). The global music industry market 
sales are increasing, but competition between different digital music channel participants 
has hindered the development of music market seriously. In the music channel, SP 
cooperates with big recording companies by adopting “guaranteed + revenue sharing” 
copyright payment mode or copyright buyout mode. In the "guaranteed + is divided into" 
copyright payment mode, big recording company impose a relatively low guaranteed fee 
from SP according to the business plan and SP share the digital music revenue with 
recording company. However, in copyright buyout mode, SP buys the copyright from 
recording company at a relatively high price but not shares revenue. Due to the leading 
role of big recording companies in the channel, most profits are often attributed to big 
recording companies and experienced service providers with strong marketing and 
promotion capability corner the digital music service market. However, small indie 
recording labels often get very little profit because of its weak channel influence. Small 
CP with excellent music products, such as individual artists and studio, only positioning 
niche market because they lack money to publicity and marketing. Some artists have to 
give up music copyright to enable their music to enter market by service providers. In 
mobile music market, telecom operator dominates the music channels and acquires more 
than 90% of the channel revenue, whereas service providers cannot survive in the market 
for a long time, being not able to pay royalties to CP by sharing digital music sales. The 
intense channel conflicts and unreasonable channel profit sharing mechanism contribute 
to deformed development of music market. In view of the above analysis, four different 
channel competition modes and optimal strategies in two cooperative channel modes are 
explored and channel system revenue loss is discovered by comparing different channel 
modes. Channel coordination mechanism is designed to enable channel participants’ and 
channel system’s revenue to achieve optimal basing on participants’ bargaining power. 
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1.2 Research Problems and Questions 
China digital music has a huge market potential. However, the digital music sales revenue 
is held down and participants compete channel control with each other to expand to the 
upstream and downstream resources. In the game, content provider has a great power 
over content resources, besides telecom operator offers mobile music interface and online 
music website access with large number of mobile user resource. With the expanding of 
mobile music market, telecom operators are seeking direct cooperation with content 
providers to acquire and produce music content. Service providers with excellent digital 
music service capability are gradually squeezed out by content providers, whereas 
telecom operators’ service capability is not able to satisfy the huge potential digital music 
demand, leading to negative impact on user service level and the development of digital 
music market. With the growing service demand from digital music users, China digital 
music market is in desperate need of new channel coordination strategies. Therefore, it’s 
with great practical significance to explore digital music channel modes and the 
coordination strategy.  
 
Now there are few researches on digital music channel competition and coordination. 
There is still no study on four digital music channel competition modes and the impact of 
service level and price on participants’ strategies. Specifically, the research gaps are 
found to lie in three aspects shown as below. 
(1)! In the former research of digital music channel mode structures, recording companies 
and digital music providers are the key research objects and the channel structure 
usually comes to be “recording companies- service providers- users” with three level 
channel length. However, telecom operators as the most important participants in the 
mobile digital music channel are seldom studied. 
 
(2)! Lots of literatures have explored the channel competition causes and channel 
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competition strategies in physic channel by using descriptive methods and 
quantitative methods, whereas game theory model is seldom adopted to research the 
channel competition and channel coordination strategy in digital music channel. 
Game theory model as an important means of scientific research can theoretically 
verify channel choosing and channel coordination strategy.  
 
(3)! The existing quantitative research on digital music channel focus on channel pricing 
strategy and contract coordination in service provider and content provider’s 
advertising revenue sharing mode, service provider’s single charge mode and 
bundling charge mode. However in Chinese music market, High price mode and 
“Low Price+Shared Revenue” mode are usually adopted between content providers 
and service providers or content providers and telecom operators, which is not yet 
focused to analyze.  
 
In view of these, two questions will be answered in this paper. How the participants 
compete in four different competitive channel modes, in which revenue and service level 
are influenced. How can participants optimize revenue in coordination rather than 
competition? The results will provide with theoretical basis for digital music channel 
competition and channel coordination. Reasonable channel cooperation modes and 
development route are explored to enhance the understanding of the digital music market 
and promote channel participants to develop optimal contracts. 
1.3 Research Innovation 
Compared with the huge potential of digital music market demand and the high 
expectations to the service level of listeners, digital music channel competition has 
seriously hindered the development of digital music market. Considering the 
characteristics of China digital music channel, this paper analyzes digital music channel 
6 
 
modes and explores the optimal strategy of participants in different channel competitive 
modes. Channel coordination mechanism is finally put forward to reduce the channel 
revenue loss in competitive situation.  
 
The purpose and innovation of this paper are as the following: 
(1)! On the basis of lots of reports and papers reading, this paper explores four different 
digital music channel competition modes. By constructing bipartite Stackelberg game 
model (Zhang Weiying, 1996, pp. 107-137) between CP and OP and tripartite 
Stackelberg game model between CP, SP and OP, participants’ optimal action 
strategies are analyzed. Numerical analysis is employed to explore the impact of 
different parameters’ change on the revenue, pricing and service level of channel 
participants. Through comparing the equilibrium results of four kinds of channel 
modes, a series of practical conclusions are drawn, which provides thought on the 
optimal action strategies of digital music channel participants in competitive 
situations to achieve optimal revenue in different modes.  
 
(2)! On the basis of reviewing the previous studies on game model of physical products 
and information goods, and considering the impact of service providers’ and telecom 
operators’ service level difference, the optimal service level is explored in different 
channel modes to offer participants the possibilities of improving service level. 
 
(3)! To motivate participants’ cooperation in digital music channel to eliminate 
competition revenue loss, this paper considers the characteristics of digital music 
channel comparing with previous studies on physical products channel coordination 
and designs bipartite and tripartite revenue sharing mechanisms on the basis of CP’s, 
SP’s and OP’s bargaining power in channels, which provides a thinking on digital 
music channel coordination in different channel modes. 
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1.4 Definitions 
(1) Digital music 
Digital music refers to music products such as songs, music or MV with music etc., which 
are spread in the form of online broadcast or Internet downloads via communication 
network like Internet, mobile Internet, and fixed communication network2. Digital music 
can be categorized into online music and mobile music. 
  
(2) Online music 
Online music, which is also known as Internet music, refers to the music provided by 
service providers to download or play on the personal computers via Internet. Mobile 
music, known as wireless music, is the music downloaded or played on the mobile phone 
via mobile Internet. 
 
(3) Content Providers (CP)      
Content providers are the main players who provide the music resource in the music 
market. Content providers consist of music production companies and copyright agency.  
 
(4)! Service Providers (SP) 
Digital music service providers process the physical music format into digital format, 
market, promote and distribute digital music. Service providers provide music service by 
operating digital music websites, and develop APP to provide mobile music service when 
having sizable user base. 
 
(5)! Telecom operators (OP) 
Telecom operators provide fixed telephone, mobile phone, internet access and other 
communications services. In the digital music industry, as the vital players, telecom 
operators not only provide Internet access service and mobile Internet services, but also 
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act as technology platform and charging channels. 
1.5 Structure of Study 
This section describes the structure arrangement.  
Chapter 1 is introduction, which introduces the selected topic background, purpose and 
significance, and elaborates the innovation of this paper. 
 
Chapter 2 is literature review, in which digital music channel modes, channel competition 
and conflicts, channel coordination are reviewed. The research gaps are also explained in 
this chapter. 
 
Chapter 3 describes the research methodology and framework, which guide the whole 
analysis to achieve research goal. 
 
Chapter 4 analyzes the digital music channel modes in details. Participants, including 
content providers, service providers and telecom operators are firstly analyzed, and then 
five digital music service modes are explored. Finally, two different channel modes and 
their characteristics of online music and mobile music are elaborated. 
 
Chapter 5 constructs and analyzes four kinds of digital music competition channel models. 
Stackelberg game model is employed to analyze the four competition modes and their 
equilibrium solutions. Through the numerical analysis, the impact of parameter change 
on the equilibrium solutions is illustrated. Finally the optimal channel mode in 
competitive situation is proposed by comparative analysis. 
  
Chapter 6 constructs and analyzes two cooperative channel models and channel 
coordination mechanisms. In this chapter, optimal revenue, service level and pricing in 
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cooperative digital music channel with SP and without SP are explored. Then revenue 
sharing mechanism basing on the bargaining power of participants is constructed to gain 
mutual cooperation and achieve optimal channel system revenue. 
 
Chapter 7 explains the conclusion and research prospects. This part mainly aims at 
summarizing the results of previous chapters and discussing the future research prospects. 
Uncertain user demand and more coordination mechanisms are worthy of future research. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW ON DIGITAL MUSIC CHANNEL AND 
COORDINATION 
2.1 Literature Review on Digital Music Channel Mode 
In this paper, digital music channel can be interpreted as digital music marketing channel. 
Marketing channel refers to the pathway that digital music is spread from producers to 
end-users. Digital music channel covers different areas, including music content creation, 
digital music service production, marketing and distribution. Research on digital music 
channel mode can be summarized into three aspectsresearch on digital music channel 
structure, research on participants’ channel behavior and research on channel 
relationships. 
 
Channel structure has three dimensions: channel length, channel width and channel 
breadth. Channel length structure is defined by the levels of channel participants involved, 
such as two-tier, three-tier and multi-tier. Premkumar (2003, pp 89-95) concluded six 
different music channel structures: record label-retailer-customer (RLRC), record label-
customer, record label- intermediary-customer (RLIC), artist- customer (AC), artist-
intermediary-customer (AIC), and audio-on-demand. The traditional RLRC remains as 
the main marketing channel structure, whereas RLIC is more and more popular in which 
customers buy digital music from intermediary like iTunes and intermediary pay record 
label for copyright. Channel width is defined by the number of participants in each level, 
such as intensive channel, exclusive channel, and etc. Channel breadth is defined by the 
number of channels, such as single channel, double channel and multiple channels. Feng 
et al.(2009, pp.241-270) investigated into the optimal channel structure and 
corresponding service and pricing strategies when introducing C2C channel alongside 
with B2C channel, with the result of that improving service could bring dual channel’s 
pricing flexibility, reduce B2C channel’s independence and allow buyers to tolerant 
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higher C2C channel redistribution costs.  
 
Channel behavior research focus on channel participants’ channel control power, channel 
conflicts and channel cooperation. Most of the researches are investigated from pricing 
strategies, profit model and piracy.  
 
Some researchers explore participants’ pricing strategy by qualitative and quantitative 
approaches. Bockstedt et al. (2006, pp.9) analyzed the industry structure, value chain and 
different stakeholders’ strategy of both traditional and digital music. Single purchase 
pricing and subscription service as the two main digital music pricing strategies are 
proposed. In USA, digital single is priced at $0.99 and a digital album is priced at $10, 
meanwhile digital music subscription is set at $15 on average. However, digital music 
service providers cannot make profit by pricing at $0.99, of which content providers get 
$0.7-$0.75 for royalties or commissions and credit card companies receive $0.27 per 
transaction. Basically service provider obtains a $0.02 loss to $0.03 profit. Service 
provider is aimed at encouraging the digital music market to pursue long-term profit 
maximization, instead of making profits in the early stage. Shapiro & Varian(1999,pp) 
proposed three different information goods pricing strategies: versioning pricing, 
bundling pricing and fixed fee contract pricing, of which fixed fee contract is suitable for 
digital audio service and creator’s album or service provider’s collection usually adopt 
bundling pricing, whereas versioning pricing is often adopted by service providers to 
differentiate digital music with different quality by pricing. Khouja & Park (2007, pp. 
109-141) analyzed physical album pricing and digital singles’ linear and nonlinear pricing 
aiming at different customer segments. The influence of digital experience goods channel 
on participants’ revenue and behavior was also explored.  
 
Some researchers investigate into channel profit model. Chen (2006, pp.20-35) explored 
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the causes of Chinese music industry’s difficult progress and proposed centralized profit 
model by analyzing music industry chain and value chain11. Bhattacharjee etc. pointed 
out digital music distributors could maximize their profits by providing mixed channel 
with both single purchase and subscription. Shan (2010, pp. 220-221) argued online 
music industry chain was not promoted simply by record companies, but was driven by 
all the participants like record companies, individual creators, online music website and 
copyright providers to achieve a win-win solution. In the mobile music industry chain, 
telecom operator takes the leading role. Digital music profit models can be categorized 
into five modes: digital single sales, a way out of bundling sales, enabling users to choose 
the singles they like to purchase freely; Direct sales, by which major record companies 
cooperate with terminal equipment manufacturers to set up their own online music store 
and make profit by the digital music downloads or terminal equipment’s sales; Value-
added digital music service, which has been made to be the vital part of 3G operator 
telecom’s value-add service by 3G’s and music phone’s development, and more high 
quality digital music value-added service is in need to appeal to customers; Terminal 
equipment pre-packaged, by which record companies make profit by providing music 
copyright for digital music terminal equipment manufacturers such as MP3 player and 
music phone manufacturers as preset music; Digital album advertising, digital album 
contains all the songs included in the album, MV, modeling photos, introduction 
information and artists’ teaser, of which revenue comes from advertising. Papies & Eggers 
(2006, pp.777-794) considered free advertising model’s effect on business models, and 
also researched the influence of alternatives between free advertising and pay model on 
customers’ choice.  Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999, 1613-1630) expanded two-product 
bundling research into multiple-product bundling research. 
 
The biggest obstacle of digital music’s development is piracy. Considering preferences of 
different customer segments on piracy, Khouja & Park (2007, pp. 109-141) found that 
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incorporation of different customer segments makes manufacturers charge lower prices 
in order to spread authorized products. They analyzed different producer pricing policies’ 
effect on creators and the results showed that royalty system could not solve double 
marginalization problem and creator’s expected price lower than producer’s optimal 
pricing allowed creator’s copyright price to increase.  
 
Gayer and Shy (2006, pp.374-384) put forward a simple model to explain that digital 
music legal action will cause profit conflict between artists and record companies, not 
only considering the vertical difference between digital copies and original version, but 
also taking the sampling effect into account. Contrary to most researches that found 
digital music piracy weakened seller’s profit, Mortimer et al. (2012, pp.3-14) examined 
file-sharing’s positive impact on complementary music products from a different angle. 
Data was collected to empirically analyze file-sharing’s impact on the profits of recorded 
music and live concert performances among different artists segments. Results showed 
that digital channel accelerated the increase of live performance. Chaney (2012, pp.42-
52) stated piracy brings two positive effects: increasing the demand for legal products; 
promoting consumers to buy legal products with higher quality. From the perspective of 
artists, grown popularity brought by piracy can improve the income of other aspects, such 
as live concert and affiliate products (mobile phone ring tones, T-shirt, hats and etc.). 
Therefore, artists and record companies play strategic game in the unified market of 
recording and live performance. A two-stage game model between artists and recording 
companies is built from the point of piracy’s positive role, followed by a revenue sharing 
contract basing on recording sales and performance. In this game model, artist is assumed 
to be the channel leader and recording sales fall into recording companies’ pockets, 
whereas artists and recording companies share the revenue of live performance. 
Consumer’s willingness to pay for live performance is proportional to the willingness to 
pay for recording music, which has a linear relationship with distance and quality of the 
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artists’ live performances. 
 
Channel relationship researches focus on channel participants’ relations and aliments, and 
by improving the trust and cooperation, the opportunism behaviors among the 
participants are reduced. Galbreth et al. (2012, pp. 603-620) explored social sharing 
profits and pricing from two aspects, which were customer social network structure and 
group decisions. However, few studies research digital music channel incentive 
mechanism. In this paper, digital music coordination mechanism is constructed to 
promote channel participants forming alliance.  
 
Digitalization brings great impact on music industry. Massive piracy brings great pressure 
on legal products and digital music sampling effect leads to an increase on listeners 
demand. Digitalization also reduces producer’s distribution, marketing and promotion 
costs. McLean et al. (2010, pp. 1365-1377) adopted critical social theory approach to 
examine digitalization’s impact on music industry. Cosain & Lee (2001, pp. 140-145) 
concluded five differences between physical recording channel and digital music channel: 
(1) music is released from physical music carriers and turns into digital content; (2) digital 
music is apt to debundling and rebundling; (3) it’s easier to control customer experience 
and dynamic pricing by digital music; (4) in digital channel physical distribution and 
facilities such as physical stores are losing their influence; (5) value-added information 
and information processing support has played a more and more important role. 
 
On the creation and production, new technology enables channel participants such as 
creators and service providers to cooperate remotely. Amateur creators can get direct 
access to listeners through platforms like social networks, which makes the outstanding 
songs soon recognized and bings creators more opportunities to participate into channels, 
thus enriching the diversity of the creation and production area6. User involvement in the 
15 
 
creation and production area makes music cater to users’ preferences. 
 
On the distribution and marketing, there appear two new trends in digital music channel 
compared with physical channel. One is Internet service providers’ and mobile operators’ 
involvement, resulting in weakened dominance of record companies in the music 
channels and enhanced channel power of service providers and mobile operators. Another 
is the possibility of individual artists and creators reaching listeners and selling digital 
music through Internet (Benjamin & Wigand, 1995, pp.62-72). Direct contacts shorten 
the music channel and help record companies and copyright agencies discover new 
potential creators, from whom copyrights are bought from Internet quickly. Net radiation 
effect of the social network enables songs to spread rapidly. Digital music channel has 
become the most effective and efficient way of promotion and distribution. 
 
On the consuming, the process of consuming has changed with the popularity of digital 
music. On one hand, digital music turns album sales into single sales and listeners can 
purchase singles instead of the whole album. Elberse collected data of digital track, digital 
album and physical album released by 200 artists from January 2005 to April 2005, and 
establishes regression models of both album sales and single sales. The empirical study 
finds that digital downloads reduce revenue from albums sales and the negative effect 
will decrease only if there is a popular song in the album (Elberse, 2010, 107-123). On 
the other hand, customers’ channel control power has enhanced and music channel has 
turned from the recording companies’ “push” marketing into “pull” marketing focused on 
the preferences of listeners. All the players in the music market are striving to innovate 
their business models. Customers become the most important participant in the chain of 
songs creation, marketing and promotion. Sun (2008, pp. 19-49) explored the impact of 
digital technology on customer behavior, customer habits, traditional value chain and 
stakeholders’ interests, from the perspective of dynamic relation between enterprise, 
16 
 
market and technology. In addition, through iTunes Store case, digital music business 
model is explored, including value proposition, target customers, customer relationship 
and partners. 
 
On the music channel process and costs, traditional music channel is no longer applicable 
to digital music. In the digitalized market, players’ role has changed with marketing and 
promotion replaced by digital technology, such as home-recording, downloads and file-
sharing (Nguyen, 2003) There is no process of storage and logistics in digital music 
channel, resulting in not only costs saving on storage and logistics in a shortened channel, 
but also costs saving on supply-demand mismatch and stockout. Internet service 
providers, user labels, telecom operators, copyright liquidation agencies and online 
billing companies appear in the digital music market. Ahn & Yoon (2009, pp. 306-325) 
adopted comparative static analysis approach to establish evaluation framework of digital 
music distribution channel’s influence. By establishing a model to compare digital 
channels and traditional channels, producers’ profits were found to decrease in 
digitalization whereas consumer surplus and social surplus were likely to increase. This 
is because digitalization reduces the fixed distribution costs and increases extra income 
from other complementary products, such as live performance. 
2.2 Research on Channel Competition and Conflicts  
There are three different types of channel competition, which are static competition, 
dynamic competition and competition with foresight. In static competition, existing 
competitors’ action strategies are not affected by the actions of new competitors, who are 
aware of the existing competitors’ actions strategies before making their own strategies 
(Farahani et al. 2014, pp. 92-118). Mathematical models are often employed to research 
facilities capability, products quality, waiting time and etc. in static competition (Aboolian 
et al. 2007, pp.40-62; Bernstein & Federgruen, 2007, pp. 242-262). In dynamic 
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competition, existing competitors’ action strategies are affected by entrant competitors’ 
entrance, in which condition Nash game equilibrium is often employed to analyze 
competitors’ pricing and service level (Tsay & Agrawal, 2000, pp. 372-391; Chun et al. 
2011, pp. 812-825). Whereas in competition with foresight, leader’s decisions are based 
on follower’s probable action strategies, and follower makes decisions according to 
leader’s optimal action strategies. Stackelberg game model (Zhang Weiying, 1996, pp. 
107-137) is applicable to solve problems in competition with foresight. 
 
Channels can be categorized into single channel and multi-channel by channel structure. 
In single channel, participants compete with upstream players and downstream players 
vertically in a channel, whereas in multi-channel participants are faced with horizontal 
competition between different channels. 
 
Table 1 Different types of channel competition 
Competition 
Type 
Characteristics Research Method 
Static 
competition 
Existing competitors’ action strategies are 
not affected by the actions of new 
competitors 
Mathematical 
models 
Dynamic 
competition 
Existing competitors’ action strategies are 
affected by entrant competitors’ entrance 
Nash game model 
Competition 
with foresight 
Leader’s decisions are based on follower’s 
and follower makes decisions according to 
leader’s optimal action strategies 
Stackelberg game 
model 
 
Pricing strategies of participants are often explored in channel competition researches. 
Bernstein et al. (2008, pp. 671-690) analyzed retailers’ pricing game equilibrium in the 
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situation that multiple retailers participated into digital retail channel or physical retail 
channel. The results show that launching digital retail channel in many cases is a kind of 
strategic demand, but not necessarily can bring profits for the retailers. Furthermore, if 
retailers are not capable of launching digital channels but to cooperate with professional 
digital retailers, prisoner’s dilemma will occur. Chiang et al. (2003, pp.1-20) explored the 
game between retailers and manufacturers by the different degree of customers accepting 
direct sales. Suo & Jin (2003, 546-550) examined two kinds of Stackelberg games (Zhang 
Weiying, 1996, pp.107-137), which were supplier-dominant and retailer-dominant 
respectively, by considering that retailer makes pricing decision and quantity decision 
simultaneously. Huang & Swaminathan (2009, pp. 258-279) proposed the optimal pricing 
strategy when retailer retailed in both digital channel and physical channel. Xu (2009) 
explored the impact of customer purchase costs and acceptance level to direct channel on 
pricing equilibrium in dual-channel. Ingene & Parry (1995, pp. 360-377) examined the 
impact of wholesale price strategy, quantity discount strategy and dual pricing strategy 
on manufacturers’ and retailers’ revenue in the condition of one manufacturer and two 
competing retailers. Results show that manufacturers should employ different pricing 
strategies in different situations. 
 
Channel competitions result in channel conflicts. Coughlan et al. (2001) proposed a 
standard definition of channel conflict in 1996: channel conflict refers to the situation that 
one or several members in the channel prevent or interfere with others to achieve goals. 
Causes of channel conflicts include different goals, conflicting areas and different 
understanding of the situation. To reduce channel conflicts, Chun et al. (2011, pp.812-
825) discussed channel conflict resolution strategy from the perspective of customer 
heterogeneity and retail service. It turns out that manufacturers adding direct channel is 
beneficial to both themselves and retailers. Direct channel enables manufacturers to reach 
not only customers who are sensitive to price but also those sensitive to service, thus 
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enlarging market coverage and enabling retailers to benefit from getting lower wholesale 
price. Tsay & Agrawal (2004a, pp. 93-110) and Cattani et al. (2004) conducted a 
systematic review of literature on channel conflict and channel coordination, in which 
some quantitative modeling methods were explored to solve channel conflicts. Webb 
(2002, pp. 95-102) stated channel conflicts resolution strategy qualitatively. Tsay and 
Agrawel (2004b) concluded that wholesale price reduction, retailers compensation and 
providing retailers with complete demand information could reduce the conflicts between 
physical channel and online direct channel. 
2.3 Research on Channel Coordination  
To eliminate channel competition, lots of channel coordination research is conducted. In 
this paper, channel coordination is similar with supply chain coordination. Supply chain 
coordination research pioneer Tsay et al. (1999) concluded that supply chain contract is a 
kind of action coordination mechanism that motive all the participants in the decentralized 
supply chain to behave like in an integrated supply chain. Cachon (2003) argued that 
supply chain contract can make the participants reach Nash equilibrium by fixing contract 
terms, such as quantity, price, quality and delivery time, and finally achieving optimal 
overall supply chain, minimizing inventory costs and realizing risk-sharing goal. 
Information 
Sharing
Information 
Technology
Coordination 
Contracts
Supply Chain 
Coordination
Coordination 
Mechanisms
Joint Decision 
Making
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Figure 1 A classification scheme of coordination; Source Govindan et al. (2003, pp. 320)  
Arshiner & Deshnukh (2008, pp.316-335) suggested coordination mechanism was 
summarized into four categories: contracts, information technology, information sharing 
and joint decision making, as shown in Figure 1. Contracts can motivate members of a 
decentralized setting to participate in the optimization of the whole system. Coordinating 
contracts can achieve optimization of the whole supply chain profit and fair risk sharing 
between the members. When designing coordination mechanism by contracts, elements 
should be considered to contain structure, coordinating incentive, theory approach, 
demand approach and time horizon. Structure can be categorized into two-echelon and 
multi-echelon by the sets of participants. For example, in two-echelon structure, 
participants may contain suppliers and manufacturers or producers and retailers, whereas 
in multi-echelon structure, participants may contain three or more of suppliers, 
manufacturers, distributors, retailers and etc. To be more detailed, two-echelon structure 
is classified into 1-1, 1-n, n-1, n-n by the number of participants in each echelon.  The 
incentives for participants to coordinate are quantity discounts, price discounts, quantity 
flexibility, lead-time and information sharing on storage level and sales forecast. The most 
common approach to study coordinating contracts is game theory. Some researchers 
approach it by using fuzzy theory, mathematics method, simulation approach and graph 
theoretical model. Demand approach can be divided into stochastic and deterministic by 
the characteristics.  
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Figure 2 Studies on supply chain coordination; Source Govindan et al. (2003, pp.327) 
Channel coordination makes it possible for participants to cooperate to realize win-win 
solutions. Some researchers explore the channel performance in both cooperated and 
incooperated channels. Chen(2010) examined muti-channel coordination in both 
centralized strategy and decentralized strategy from various angles of single product, 
multiple products, digital channels based on information intermediary and service 
cooperation. Gong et al. (2008, pp. 26-30) researched the pricing strategy of three-echelon 
channel system comprised of manufacture, retailer and third-party logistics service 
provider, in both centralized and decentralized strategy. Li & Wang (2007, pp. 1-16) 
argued that channel system profits in cooperated were bigger than those in incooperated, 
as well as the buyer’s optimal order quantity. However, seller’s wholesale pricing in 
cooperated channel was smaller than that in incooperated channel. 
 
As an important channel coordination mechanism, revenue sharing contract has been 
explored in many literature researches. Yan (2011, pp. 636-642) studied the strategic role 
of differentiation brand strategy and profit sharing strategy in multi-channel production-
22 
 
retail supply chain, and found that differentiation brand strategy was not able to achieve 
full channel coordination but effectively reduced the channel competition and conflicts, 
and a new kind coordination mechanism-profit sharing mechanism was in demand. 
Cachon & Lariviere (2005, pp. 30-44) analyzed the advantages and limitations of revenue 
sharing contract in supply chain coordination and argued that revenue sharing strategy 
not only coordinated supply chain with single retailers but also coordinated that with 
multiple retailers competing sales. Guo et al.(2011, pp. 433-440) explored two-stage 
revenue sharing contract in dynamic market environment by discussing retailer’s twice-
ordering behavior using a two-stage Newsboy model. Cai (2010, pp. 22-36) considered 
supplier’s and retailer’s negotiation ability in different supply chain structures, and 
explored supplier’s and retailer’s strategies in single retailer mode, supplier direct sales 
mode, supplier direct sales combining with retailer mode and two retailers mode. 
Chen(2011, pp 293-300) explored supplier’s and retailer’s buyback prices in profit 
sharing strategy in a single manufacturer and single retailer decentralized decision 
making supply chain. 
  
There are few literatures on digital music channel coordination. Traditional physical 
supply chain coordination strategy like buyback contract and return policy is no longer 
suitable for digital music products (Ramnath & Shivendu, 2005, pp. 400-417). Yang 
(2009) constructed models to research supply chain contracts of single charge mode and 
advertising charge mode in online music supply chain, and found the incomplete 
coordination problems in both of this two modes. He argued that advertising charge 
modes was superior to single charge mode, and advertising charge mode could achieve 
channel coordination under certain conditions by introducing revenue sharing contract. 
Jeong et al. (2012, pp. 590-603) considered fixed fee contract and single contract. In fixed 
fee contract, no matter how many songs that listeners download from retailer’s website, 
recording companies charge a fixed fee for the album, whereas in single contract which 
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is more common in the digital music industry, recording companies and retailers charge 
for every downloaded songs. Contract type and different piracy risk cost’s impact on 
supply chain pricing, profits and supply chain coordination was explored. The result 
shows that both of the piracy risk cost and contract type influence supply chain profits, 
and fixed fee transfer contract can realize supply chain coordination. The profitability of 
the fixed fee contract increases with the enlarging of online market scale. 
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3. METHODOLOGY AND FRAMEWORK 
3.1 Research Methodology 
This chart clarifies the research methods and techniques used for the research. The goal 
of this research is to firstly find out the digital music channel modes in Chinese markets, 
and secondly to identify how different participants compete in different channel modes. 
The third goal is to discover how the participants cooperate in different channel to achieve 
channel coordination by revenue sharing. The objectives are reached by literature review, 
descriptive approach and Stackelberg game model (Zhang Weiying, 1996, pp.107-137).  
  
The study is started by exploring into literature review on digital music channel mode, 
and then moves to literature review on channel competition and conflicts. Finally 
literature review on channel coordination is studied, following the research gaps are 
drawn on the basis of literature review. Literature review is firmly serving the whole 
research on digital music channel in Chinese market. In order to define the digital music 
channel modes in Chinese market, lots of website information, data and published paper 
are collected to elaborate the Chinese music market overview, participants, service modes, 
physical music and digital music channel mode. This lay the basis of the further analysis 
of the competitive and cooperative relationship between different participants. 
 
Due to the obvious strategy adoption between CP, SP and OP in different channel structure, 
this formulates typical Stackelberg game model (Zhang Weiying, 1996, pp. 107-137). 
Game refers to the process that individuals, groups or organizations choose and 
implement simultaneously or successively, once or many times from their possible actions 
or strategies set to reach the corresponding results or profits respectively by relying on 
the information that they grasp under certain environmental conditions and constraints.  
In economics, game theory is usually adopted to research the decision-making and 
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equilibrium problem when a certain economic agent’s strategy can not only influence but 
also be impacted by other economic agents’ strategies. Stackelberg model, which was put 
forward by Stackelberg in 1934, depicts a two companies complete information dynamic 
game in which one company with dominant position acts first to select the yield or price 
and another company with subordinate position selects the yield or price following the 
dominant company’s strategies. Thus, Stackelberg game model is employed to analyze 
the competitive strategy in different mode depending on if SP participate into channel. 
Then comparative analysis is employed to analyze the differences and similarities 
between different modes. 
 
Basing on the competitive channel mode, digital music channel cooperative equilibrium 
is explored by taking derivative with respect to parameters to compare the revenue loss 
in competitive mode. Finally digital music channel coordination mechanisms is 
constructed by revenue sharing, which could eliminate the competitive mode revenue loss 
and achieve win-win solution for participants. 
3.2 Research Content and Framework 
In view of the unbalanced development of the digital music market and the channel 
competition problems, digital music channel participants, service modes and channel 
modes in Chinese market are analyzed. And then according to the four channel 
competition modes, Stackelberg game model model (Zhang Weiying, 1996, pp. 107-137) 
are established and numerical analysis is employed to explore the impact of parameters, 
such as service level and service price and etc., on game equilibrium solution, followed 
by comparative analysis to seek the optimal channel mode in competitive situations. 
Finally, channel game equilibrium in cooperative situation is explored to seek the channel 
revenue loss in competitive situation, and the channel achieves coordination by 
constructing revenue sharing mechanism basing on participants’ bargaining power. 
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Figure 3 Research framework and methodology 
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4 DIGITAL MUSIC CHANNEL MODES IN CHINESE MARKET 
Music was distributed in physical music carriers (music sheets, tapes or CD) by physical 
retailers before digital music spread. With the prosperity of digital music, music industry 
is experiencing the transition from product-oriented market to service-oriented market.  
 
In this chapter, firstly specific data is introduced to analyze the development of global 
and Chinese music industry. In both of the global and Chinese markets, digital music 
market is expanding year by year, while physical music market is shrinking. Digital music 
begins to gradually replace physical music as the main consumption way. Due to channel 
competition and piracy, China digital music market share lags far behind the USA and 
Japan, though with a large digital music market potential. The vast majority of the 
Chinese digital music income comes from the mobile music sector. Telecom operators 
occupy more than 90% of the whole profit in the mobile music sector, whereas the service 
provider cannot survive and telecom operator’s service capability cannot meet the users’ 
demand. China’s vast digital music market potential has yet to play out. Then the 
development status, profit model and channel status of the main participants including 
content providers, service providers and telecom operators are explored. The participants 
are found to seek the upstream and downstream resources to enhance its channel control. 
Five digital music service modes, which are download store, subscription service, music 
stream service, internet radio, social network, are further analyzed, followed by an 
exploration into the new characteristics of digital music supply chain from the perspective 
of creation & production, distribution & marketing, consumption and supply chain costs.  
Lastly piracy, which impedes the development of digital music market, is analyzed from 
the angles of present situation, forming reasons and solutions.  
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4.1 Global Music Market Overview 
Music revenue mainly comes from physical recording, digital music, live performance 
and synchronization. As seen from Table 4, global recording industry revenue is 
decreasing due to the pitfall of physical records revenue. Whereas revenue in digital 
music, live performance and synchronization is increasing year by year, but not enough 
to make up for the physical records sales drop loss. Piracy is the root cause of the sharp 
decline in music sales. Single sales rather than bundling album sales are impacting the 
music industry. Listeners tend to buy their favorite single songs instead of the whole 
album. 
 
As shown in Figure 4 and Table 2, physical music revenue in 2007 was $17.3 billion, and 
in the following 5 years it dropped 46%. Whereas digital music revenue increased by 
81%, from $3.2 billion in 2007 to $5.8 billion in 2012, and the compound annual growth 
rate reached 12.6%. Data shows that global physical music consumption has gradually 
shift to digital music consumption and in the next few years digital music is likely to 
exceed physical music to become the main consumption format. According to IFPI, at the 
beginning of 2011 digital music service providers provided international service in 
23countries, while in 2013 more than 100 countries were covered. Now there are more 
than 500 authorized digital music service providers in the world, providing 30 million 
tracks. Digital music consumption gradually becomes the mainstream. 
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Figure 4 Annual revenues of physical recording and digital music in global recording industry; 
Source IFPI (2011) & RIAJ (2013, pp 2) 
Table 2 Annual revenues of global recording industry by music categoriesBillion Dollars); Source 
IFPI (2011) & RIAJ (2013, pp 29) 
 
Physical 
recording 
Digital 
music 
Live 
performance Synchronization Total 
2007 17.3 3.2 0.7 0 21.2 
2008 14.8 4.2 0.8 0 19.8 
2009 12.9 4.6 0.8 0 18.3 
2010 11.1 4.8 0.9 0.3 17.2 
2011 10.2 5.2 0.9 0.3 16.6 
2012 9.4 5.8 0.9 0.3 16.5 
4.2 Chinese Music Market Overview 
As shown in Figure 5, Chinese physical music and digital music sales trends kept the 
same with the global ones from 2007 to 2012. Chinese digital music sales exceeded 
physical music sales in 2008 and the digital music market share reached 82% in 2012. In 
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the five years, digital music revenue grew by 103% while physical music revenue fell by 
62%. In 2012, China’s recording industry revenue reached $92.4 million, ranking 20 for 
the first time in the global music market. According the IFPI Digital Music Report, 
China’s music piracy rate reached 99%. Listeners have formed the habit of getting music 
for free. The music industry is facing with the great challenges of changing the listeners’ 
habits.  
 
Figure 5 Annual revenues of digital music and physical recording in Chinese market from 2007 to 
2012; Source IFPI (2011) & RIAJ (2013, pp 29) 
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Figure 6 Chinese digital music revenues by categories from 2007 to 2011; Source IFPI (2011)  
China’s digital music sales come from downloads, master ringtones, ringback tunes and 
advertising, as shown in Figure 6. Master ringtones and ringback tunes are the main 
source of sales. Ringback tunes sales accounted for $30.3 million in 2008, but decreasing 
in the following years. The proportion of advertising accounting for the digital music is 
increasing.  
 
According to “2011 China’s Digital Music Market Annual Report (Abstract)”, mobile 
music market size accounted for 86.3% of the digital music market size55. According to 
“2012 China’s Online Music Market Annual Report” issued by China Culture Ministry, 
in 2012, Chinese Internet users reached 564 million within which 420 million are the 
mobile Internet users, and mobile phone replaced PC as the biggest Internet terminals. 
Chinese digital music user scale reached 436 million in 2012 and more than 50.9% of 
mobile Internet users listened to mobile music. Authorized music enterprises reached 575 
in 2012. China’s mobile music total revenue achieved 31.72 billion RMB, of which 29 
billion RMB belonged to telecom operators while content providers got only 2.72 billion 
RMB. Within mobile music users, 53.7% get access to China mobile, and 26.7% get 
access to China Unicom, and 19.6% remaining get access to China Telecom2.  
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4.3 Participants in Digital Music Channels 
In the digital music channels, there are content providers, service providers, telecom 
operators, terminal manufacturers and users. Chart 3.2 shows the participants’ role, core 
resources, revenue stream and the typical representatives in Chinese market.   
 
Table 3 Main participants in digital music channel 
Participants Role Core 
resources 
Revenue stream Typical 
representatives in 
Chinese market 
Content 
Providers(CP) 
recording 
companies, 
reators 
Copyright, 
artists resource 
Royalties, physical 
recording sales 
China Record 
Corporation, Taihe 
Rye Music, Warner 
Music, Rock Records 
service 
providers (SP) 
Search Engine, 
Portal 
Websites, 
Professional 
Music 
Company 
marketing, 
service 
providers 
branding 
Subscription service, 
advertising, gaming, 
software, revenue 
sharing with OP 
Sina Music, aigo 
MUSIC, Baidu 
Music, A8 MusicC, 
China Mobile 
Wireless Music Portal 
telecom 
operators (OP) 
Communicatio
n service 
companies 
Channel 
resources 
Channel fee (band 
width), mobile music 
service 
China Mobile, China 
Telecom, China 
Unicom 
terminal 
manufacturers 
Phone 
manufacturers 
Music 
promotion 
terminals 
terminals sales, 
music software and 
content promotion 
revenue sharing 
HUAWEI, ZTE 
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4.3.1 Content Providers (CP)      
Content providers consist of music production companies and copyright agency. As the 
most important role in music production, recording companies sign singers, produce 
music and promote with its powerful marketing and distribution channels. Copyright 
agency buy copyright from individuals or recording companies, and then sell to service 
providers to take the advantage of price differences. However, with shortened and 
transparent digital music supply chain, copyright agency is facing more and more 
challenges.   
     
The recording market consists of several big international recording companies and 
varieties of small and medium-sized independent recording companies. The world biggest 
recording company, Universal Music with headquarter in USA which is owned by the 
French Vivendi, bought recording segment from EMI Music in 2011, and Sony Music 
bought EMI’s copyright segment. The “big three” Universal Music, Sony Music and 
Warner Music account for about 70% of the world music recording and publishing market, 
and own large numbers of labels, distribution and promotion channels. They are engaged 
in most activities of the value chain, including recording, production, marketing and 
distributing, forming vertical integration in the value chain in which major recording 
companies own and control the production and distribution network57. With the 
decreasing in the recording sales, recording companies turn to provide copyright to digital 
music market players.  
    
With the development of digital production and distributing channels, more and more 
independent producers and small firms join the music market to produce, distribute and 
promote digital music. These independent producers and small music publishers focus on 
niche market with great flexibility and innovation. However, it’s difficult for them to raise 
funds by royalty, resulting in lack of human and financial resources in response to 
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technology innovation. High marketing and promoting costs make it difficult to distribute 
worldwide. Many indie labels cooperate with big recording companies to distribute. In 
some case recording companies sign contract to buy the label and even the whole firm if 
they see potential or success in the artists. 
 
In Chinese market, the leading recording companies Taihe Rye Music, Ocean Butterflies 
and Wonderful Music, with shorter development history and less resource of songs and 
artists, can neither compete with the big international recording companies, nor follow 
them to cooperate with digital music service providers by charging high royalties. As 
content providers’ core competence comes from copyright resources, they are engaged in 
producing music with their own labels and buying copyrights. Some of them start to 
produce and provide digital music service as service providers to shorten the channels 
and gain more channel control. 
4.3.2 Service Providers (SP) 
In China digital music market, the leading authorized music service providers include 
Baidu, China Mobile, Duomi, Kugou, Kuwo, Tencent and Xiami, as shown in Table 4. 
They transform the physical music format into digital format, market, promote and 
distribute digital music. 
 
At the initial of mobile music service development, subject to the channel and users, 
mobile music service providers seek cooperation with telecom operators, who help 
deliver music service to listeners with their scalable users and developed settlement 
platform. However, with the development of 3G network and the popularity of smart 
phones, mobile service providers can reach the users by mobile Internet access. Users 
download and enjoy music by the installed mobile music APP or mobile Internet websites. 
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The main costs of digital music service providing come from royalties and bandwidth 
costs. Take Kugo as an instance, every thousand times stream listening, 2.5 RMB 
royalties is paid to content providers and 1.6 RMB bandwidth fee is paid to telecom 
operators, thus 4.1 RMB is spent in total on every thousand times stream listening58. 
Service providers continuously explore new business models to seek stable profits. 
Kugou and Kuwo provide online games with music, enabling users play games while 
listening to music, and service providers and game developers share gaming revenues 
together according to a certain proportion. Advertising, games combined, third-party 
software and subscription services become the main revenue stream for service providers. 
For Kuwo, 40% revenue comes from games and the remaining 60% comes from 
advertising. 
 
Brand influence and promotion capability is the core competence for service providers. 
To secure the channel control and shorten digital music value chain, on one hand, service 
providers seek to explore artists to grasp the upstream content resource and digital 
copyright technology. On the other hand, they cooperate with downstream telecom 
operators to provide service bundles. In France, service provider Deezer collaborate with 
telecom operator Orange, and in Dutch Spotify cooperates with KPN. In China, China 
Unicom launches an 8 RMB music package which is free of data traffic with Duomi, and 
users can get access to music by Duomi APP on the mobile phone.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 Typical digital music service providers in Chinese market 
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Type Representatives Strengths Weakness 
Music search 
websites 
Baidu Music Powerful music 
search capability, 
high brand awareness 
and advertising 
attraction 
Lacking Music 
information    
Comprehensive 
portal websites 
Sina Music, Tencent 
Music, Netease 
Music Channel, 
Sohu Music 
High brand 
awareness and 
advertising 
attraction, rich music  
information,  
Lacking music 
search function 
Professional 
music websites 
1ting Music, 520 
Music, Haoting 
Music, 9Sky Music 
Comprehensive 
music service to cater 
for different users, 
various revenue 
streams 
Weak brand 
awareness and 
advertising 
attraction 
4.3.3 The Big Three Telecom Operators in Chinese Market 
The three big telecom operators dominate mobile music channel with large user base, 
strong marketing capability and developed payment channels. They control the content 
resource and marketing channels by launching central music platforms or music bases to 
stretch their business to upstream and downstream. Telecom operators’ revenue accounts 
for 95% of Chinese overall mobile music market. They provide Internet access service 
and mobile Internet services, and act as technology platform and charging channels. The 
mobile music service refers to the value-added music service through SMS, MMS, WAP, 
wireless voice value-added service, including wireless music club, music downloads and 
ringback service. Value-added music service provided by service providers helps telecom 
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providers increase user engagement. 
 
(1)!China Mobile 
As the largest communications service provider, China Mobile’s revenue reached 560.4 
billion RMB with 710 million users in 2012. China Mobile Wireless Music Base, which 
was launched in 2005, integrates six systems including operation analysis, customer 
service support, business review, channel management, copyright management and work 
order management, providing value-added music service through WWW, WAP, SMS, 
IVR, mobile APP, PC client and Migu Magazine.  
 
Now China Mobile Wireless Music Base is the largest licensed music wireless publishing 
platform, trading platform and music membership interacting platform with 1.7 million 
licensed songs and 100 million monthly music sales. China Mobile Wireless Music Club 
founded in 2006 provides one-stop digital music service like ringtones, music downloads, 
privilege of getting concert tickets and attending events. Now the membership number 
grows into 60 million. China Mobile cooperates with mobile terminal manufacturers to 
customize mobile phones which have special music play button and a built-in China 
Mobile Wireless Music website links. 
 
Music downloads on China Mobile Central Music Platform reached 4.3 billion times in 
2012 and its revenue with more than 20 billion accounted for 83% of the whole wireless 
music market in China. China Mobile sought upstream and downstream cooperation with 
over 1000 partners, including Universal Music, Sony Music, Columbia Records, Sohu 
Wireless Music, Rolling Stones and etc. China mobile signs an exclusive contract with 
many recording companies that the content resource cannot be provided to other telecom 
operators. 
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(2)!China Telecom 
China Telecom, as the second largest communication service provider, has more than 100 
million broadband Internet access subscribers, 160 million mobile users and 163 million 
fixed telephone households by the end of 2012. China Mobile launched “Love Music” 
mobile music service to provide ringtones, music downloads and music club membership 
service with Warner Music, Taihe Rye Music, EMI, Universal Music, Rolling Stones in 
2007. In 2009, China Telecom Digital Music Operation Center is founded to integrate 
content resource, value chain cooperation, customer consumption data management, 
marketing and channel management. The Love Music Club provides integrated music 
products and services (ringtones, downloads, music box, music magazines, etc.) as a 
music experiencing and sharing platform. 
 
China Telecom’s digital music service target users are cell phone users and part of the 
fixed phone and Internet users. China Telecom is leading in the fixed phone and 
broadband user scale but lag behind in the cell phone user scale. The main revenue stream 
of China telecom digital music service comes from ringtones sector, adopting revenue 
sharing mechanism with content providers. Although being late in launching digital 
music service, in 2012 China Telecom initiated Love Music Honeycomb Plan to develop 
integrated music APP production, publish, distribution, payment and settlement platform. 
 
(3)!China Unicom 
As the third largest telecom operator, China Unicom provides comprehensive music 
services including music information, ringtones, music (single, ringing, MV) downloads, 
online listening, club memberships etc. through its central music platform and mobile 
music club. China Unicom keeps mining users’ music preference to push music with the 
similar style according to their subscription or collection records. Users can put acquired 
music in the cloud and enjoy from different terminals, such as PC, tablet computers, 
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mobile phone and automotive audio. 
4.4 Digital Music Service Modes 
Digital music service modes refer to the ways users acquire licensed digital music 
products and service. In this section, five digital music service modes are studied, 
including download store, subscription, music stream, internet radio and social network. 
In the digital music market, business models are keeping innovating and digital music 
service modes are varying in different markets. As Mr Wells of universal music said: "all 
of our market is not a single road of development, each country is unique", "in every 
country, consumers interacting with music differ in thousands ways. Each country has 
different economic conditions, different levels of broadband penetration and level of 
development of digital technology and equipment". 
 
Table 5 Typical service provider representatives of different digital music service modes 
 Global service provider  
representatives 
Chinese service provider  
representatives 
Download store iTunes, AmazonMP3, 
7digital, 
Jingdong, Amazon China, Taobao 
Subscription Spotify, Deezer QQ Music, Douban FM Pro 
Music stream Youtube Youku 
Internet radio Pandora, lastfm, TDC, 
WiMP,FASTWEB, 
MusicHub 
Kuwo Music, Baidu Music, 
Kugou Music, Duomi Music, 
Xiami Music, Douban Music, QQ 
Music 
Telecom 
operators 
Vodafone, CuboMusica, China Mobile, China Telecom, 
China Unicom 
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4.4.1 Download Store 
As the main revenue stream of digital music, single downloads grow steadily, and over 
500 authorized service providers provide 18 million songs available for download. Global 
download store sales volume reached 4.3 billion in 2012 and its revenue reached $5.6 
billion, which accounted for 70% of the digital music market. The success of download 
store can be attributed to three factors: payment ways are verified to be convenient and 
secure; download stores safeguard the legitimacy of acquiring digital music; users trust 
the brands of download stores. 
 
Download store mode began with Cductive selling MP3 format music online for $0.99 
per song for the first time in 1996. After that a group of music download stores appeared 
like MP3.com. In 2000, as a major recording company, Sony Music first time set up 
download store “The Store”. Major recording companies gave up authorization on 
MP3.com and Cductive and started to collaborate to launch their own online music stores. 
AOL, RealNetworks, EMI and BMG founded the joint venture AOL MusicNet, and Sony 
and EMI jointly founded Sony’s Pressplay, followed by Apple, Google, Amazon and 
Microsoft joining the market. 
 
In 2003, Apple launched iTunes store to provide digital music downloads, including 
singles, music video, ringtones, and other services such as audio books, TV programs, 
movies and games. iTunes turned to be extremely popular in the first year and its turnover 
exceeded Musicnet and Pressplay. iTunes’s success lies in adopting the unified pricing 
model of 99 cents per song and making downloaded music available to play in different 
terminals. In November 2011, Apple and Google launched iTunes match for the ios 
platform and Google Music service for the android platform respectively, which enabled 
users to pay an annual fee of $24.99 to get access to their music library through different 
terminals by cloud service. 
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In China, the big download stores, including Jingdong, Amazon China and Taobao, 
provide high quality music download. Generally in American digital music market, each 
single is priced at $0.99 by online music service providers and $0.65 by content providers. 
In 2012, the revenue of iTunes music store reached $4.3 billion but $3.4 billion royalties 
were paid to content providers2. Content providers tend to set high price for the royalties, 
because online music sales reduce the physical music sales and users have the freedom to 
buy only one or two songs online instead of the whole album. Basically if taking away 
royalties and credit card companies trading fees, digital music service providers cannot 
make money by setting price at $0.99 but they’d like to encourage users to buy digital 
music in download store to seek profits in the long term61. 
4.4.2 Subscription Service 
Usually digital music service providers adopt “free value-added” business models, in 
which users can listen to music for free but have the limitations of listening time every 
week, number of songs and commercial advertisement intercut. Free service attracts users 
to experience the music service and gradually turn them into premium service users with 
higher quality music service. In the premium service, users are able to listen to high 
quality music offline without the limitations of listening time and commercial 
advertisement intercut. In the subscription service, by tracking listeners’ listening records, 
digital music service providers can dig out listeners’ preferences and recommend other 
songs with the similar style, making it easier for users to find new music. Users don’t 
need to buy songs separately and the free service helps improve user experience. 
 
Improvement of user experience, integration of social networks and different pricing 
strategies contribute to a rapid growth of subscription service. In 2012, Global digital 
music subscriber reached 20 million. Microsoft offers Xbox Music at a monthly 
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subscription fee of $9.993. Spotify and Deezer spread quickly and become internationally 
renowned digital music service brands with 5 million and 3 million premium users 
respectively. Spotify succeeds in transiting free music service users to premium service 
users at a conversion rate of 15%2. 
 
In China, Douban FM provides online music listening for over 10 million users. In 
January 2013, Douban launched FM Pro, and users can enjoy high quality music without 
commercial advertisements by paying a monthly fee of 10 RMB or 50 RMB for half year. 
Baidu introduces a common VIP service, a 5 RMB monthly subscription package with 
free download and high quality songs online listening. If users want to download high 
quality songs without any advertisements, the common VIP service can be upgraded to 
platinum VIP service by paying 10 RMB monthly. Tencent QQ Music provides users with 
“Green Diamond” music service, which contains high quality songs download and the 
privileges of access to games and concerts. 
 
In the subscription service mode, digital music service providers reward content providers 
by two ways: when users download the songs, royalties are paid to content providers; and 
when users listen to music online, royalties is paid by every play. 
4.4.3 Music Stream Service 
YouTube is the world's biggest online video site, with more than 800 million active users 
worldwide. And the integration of social networks such as YouTube and Facebook, makes 
music quickly spread in social networks. Free listening to the music and the ability to 
discover new music promoted the users to use music video streaming service. The 
monthly music video playback volume of VEVO, the most popular professional music 
channel in YouTube, exceeds 4 billion times. Now VEVO is expanding investment and 
constructing multiple devices and platforms. The music video profits come from its vast 
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online advertising business with more than 550 advertisers. 
 
In China, the largest video streaming service provider Youku, which was founded in 
December of 2006, covers PC, TV and mobile terminals. From the second quarter of 2012, 
mobile Internet traffic soared in the Youku, and by November of 2013 it surges into 300 
million’s playback. 
4.4.4 Internet Radio Stations 
Internet radio stations create different playlists according to different genre of songs, 
themes or artists, making audience enjoy casual experience as broadcast. American most 
popular Internet radio service Pandora accounts for 8% of all American radio traffic, as 
many as 66 million active users. 
 
1Ting Music, Chinese largest online music website, integrates the original music, Internet 
radio and original song platform. It has the original song show platform Coke Channel 
and radio show. 
4.5 Physical Music Channel Mode and Digital Music Channel Mode  
4.5.1 Physical Music Channel Mode 
In the physical recording industry, music market consists of content providers, music 
products manufacturers, channel agents, distributors and users. Recording companies 
play a vital role in the whole music value chain. They sign artists to record and also sign 
the copyright agreements. Then the recorded music works are sent to music products 
manufacturers to largely compressed into disks, tapes, which are distributed by 
distribution department of the recording companies or the professional distribution 
companies. The revenue stream of physical music channel comes from records or other 
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Figure 7 Physical recording channel mode 
4.5.2 Digital Music Channel Mode 
Digital music can be categorized into online music and mobile music, which have 
different channel modes. In the online music channel, service providers, terminal 
equipment providers and telecom operators acquire music contents from content 
companies. Service providers offer digital music through websites after turning the music 
contents into digital ones. Telecom operators offer online music through their music base 
or platforms. Terminal manufacturers, mainly PC manufactures, cooperate with service 
providers to embed music contents or music player software into terminals. Service 
providers and telecom operators get revenue from advertising, gaming and user purchase. 
Advertisers and gaming developers purchase music contents from contents providers to 
implant into advertising and gaming. 
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Figure 8 Online music channel mode 
Different from online music channel, mobile music channel is usually longer. Service 
provider purchase copyright from content providers and sell digital music after producing 
to telecom operators, who act as the user interface. Users afford service fee to telecom 
operators, who will share revenue with service providers. Furthermore, service providers 
and telecom operators get part revenue from embedded advertising and gaming. In China 
digital music market, China Mobile initially shared revenue with service providers 
according to a percent of 15:85, while service providers and content providers share 
revenue according to their contracts. After the establishment of mobile music base, China 
Mobile cooperate with content providers directly and carry on a revenue sharing of 5:5. 
China Unicom share revenue with service providers in accordance with 3:7, and service 
providers give half revenue to content providers. 
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Figure 9 Online music channel mode 
As shown in Figure 10, a channel cooperation mode is employed to simplify the channel 
modes of both online music and mobile music. 
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Figure 10 Simplified digital music channel mode  
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5 THE GAME ANALYSIS OF DIGITAL MUSIC CHANNEL IN COMPETITION 
In the digital music channels, content providers (CP), service providers (SP), telecom 
operator (OP) compete with each other to acquire optimal profits. To study the optimal 
pricing, service strategies and revenues of CP, SP and OP in different competing channels, 
four competing channel modes are analyzed which are High Price without SP Mode, 
“Low Price+Shared Revenue” without SP Mode, High Price with SP participation Mode 
and “Low Price+Shared Revenue” with SP participation Mode. In this chapter, the 
participants’ optimal revenue, optimal pricing and service level are firstly explored, and 
then numerical analysis is adopted to study the influence of service cost coefficient, 
revenue sharing ratio, user price sensitive factor and user service level sensitive factor on 
the results of game equilibrium. At last, by comparing the four competing channel modes, 
optimal channel selection strategy is found.  
 
Figure 11 Tri-partite gaming of CP SP OP 
As shown in Figure 11, according to the fact that whether SP participate in the channels, 
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there are two channel structures: CP cooperate with OP directly without SP, OP take the 
role of SP and provide service for users; SP buy the music copyright from CP and provide 
digital music service for users through the OP’s access. In the cooperation situation of CP 
and OP, there are two different contract modes: OP buy the copyright at a high price; OP 
buy the copyright at a low price and share the revenue with CP. SP master a greater digital 
content production and marketing capability compared with OP, which means a higher 
music service level of SP that influence music pricing and sales volume. When SP 
participate, channels are lengthened and CP, SP and OP compete with each other. In this 
situation, two different channel modes are considered: SP buy music copyright at a high 
price and sell the digital music content to OP at a relatively high price; SP buys music 
copyright at a low price and sell digital music content at a low price to OP, then OP share 
the revenue with SP and CP together. 
 
In this chapter, considering service level’s influence on user demand, Stackelberg game 
model (Zhang Weiying, 1996, pp. 107-137) is introduced to analyze the competing digital 
music channels game equilibrium and then numerical analysis and comparative analysis 
are adopted to reach a series of conclusions.  
5.1 Model Assumption and Parameter Settings 
In the digital music channel, CP, SP and OP are assumed to be risk neutral and perfectly 
rational. To eliminate the unnecessary factors’ influence on the results, costs unrelated to 
service level are not considered. Due to the fact that content providers dominate channels 
in Chinese markets, in the following analysis CP are assumed to take the leading role in 
the game.  
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Table 6 Parameters set and explanations in the model 
CP cp  Copyright price of every single 
cc  Copyright cost of every single 
cΠ  Revenue of CP 
OP op  Digital music service Price provided for users 
od  Digital music service Demand  
oΠ  Revenue of OP 
oc  Digital music service cost of OP 
os  Digital music service level that OP provide 
SP sp  Digital music service price that SP sell to OP 
sΠ  Revenue of SP 
sc  Digital music service cost of SP 
ss  Digital music service level that SP provide 
Π  Revenue of the whole channel 
5.2 Game Analysis on Digital Music Channels in the Situation that CP and OP 
participate 
In the digital music market, to obtain greater channel control power, OP strive to expand 
their business scope to upstream and cooperate with CP to buy the copyright directly, 
replacing SP to produce digital music contents and provide users with digital music 
service through their own platforms. In the situation of CP and OP participating into 
channels without SP, CP with copyright resources and OP with user scale and digital 
music production capability compete in the channels. As “content is the king”, content 
providers have the dominating power over the channels. In this section, considering the 
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dynamic game relation between OP and CP, CP decide the copyright price, and then OP 
decide the offering price and service level to users by considering users’ service and price 
acceptation ability. As CP act first and then SP take action according to CP’s strategy, a 
two-stage Stackelberg game model (Zhang Weiying, 1996, pp. 107-137) analysis is 
adopted to explore the game equilibrium solution, namely OP and CP’s optimal strategies 
in the competition. 
 
In the absence of SP in the channel, CP and SP adopt two kinds of cooperation modes. 
One is CP sell music copyright to OP at a high price and OP take all the risks of digital 
music service. However, to reduce of the risks, OP tend to buy music copyright at a low 
price and share revenue with CP according to a contract signed before. Now China Mobile 
music base adopt a five-to-five revenue sharing scheme with CP. 
 
In this section, CP and SP’s game equilibrium strategies and different parameters’ 
influence on the equilibrium results are explored in both High Price SP Mode and “Low 
Price+Shared Revenue” without SP Mode. Finally, a series of conclusions are achieved 
by comparative analysis. 
 
Figure 12 Channel structure diagram of CP and OP participating into channel 
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5.2.1 High Copyright Price without SP Mode 
Consumers are sensitive to both price and service level. Here digital music service 
demand function is defined as a function of a leaner relationship with price and service 
level. Let Bd  denote the basic user demand of digital music. Let α  and β  denote the 
effect parameter of price and service. So user demand is defined as below: 
  ooBo psdd ** αβ −+=    (5.1) 
OP’s service cost is related to its service level. Iyer (1998, pp. 338-355), Tsay et al. (2000, 
pp. 372-391, Mukhopadhyay et al. (2008, pp. 950-958), Feng et al (2009, pp. 241-270) 
assume service cost to be the convex function of service level. This paper argues that 
OP’s service cost and service level are in line with the function: co =η
so2
2   wherein η  
is a known constant that is shared by all the participants in the channel. Feng et al assume 
η =1  in their research and Mukhopadhyay et al think that η  conforms to a random 
distribution f (η) . 
 
CP takes the leading role in digital music channel and determine copyright price first, and 
then OP choose the user service level and price after observing CP’s action. That is to say 
that CP’s copyright price affects OP’s digital music service level and price offered to users. 
Below Stackelberg game model (Zhang Weiying, 1996, pp. 107-137) is established 
between CP and OP, and backward induction approach is used to solve the Nash 
equilibrium solution. OP’s revenue is its sales revenue minus copyright cost and digital 
music content production cost, namely: 
  oocoo cdpp −−=Π *)(    (5.2) 
OP’s goal is to maximum its revenue by choosing proper music service level and price in 
the condition of co pp > , namely: 
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),(max ooopp spco
Π
>    (5.3) 
Above formula is taken derivative with respect to op  and os  to obtain two 
simultaneous equations, which can be solved to achieve OP’s optimal price and service 
level: 
  
2
2
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2 βαη
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2
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−
−
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   (5.4) 
Then the above optimal price *op  is substituted into demand function od  to get the 
optimal sales volume: 
  
2
*
2
)(
βαη
ααη
−
−
= cBo
pdd
   (5.5) 
CP’s revenue function is: 
  occc dcp *)( −=Π    (5.6) 
CP’s goal is to maximum its revenue by choosing proper music copyright price in the 
condition of co cp > , namely: 
  
)(max cccp pcc
Π
>    (5.7) 
*
od  is substituted into Πc , followed by taking derivative for Πc  to obtain the optimal 
copyright price: 
  α
α
2
* cB
c
cdp +=
   (5.8) 
Channel system’s revenue is: 
  co ∏+Π=∏     (5.9) 
Through the above calculation, the following equilibrium table can be drawn: 
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Table 7 Equilibrium results in High Copyright Price without SP Mode 
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It can be seen from the above game equilibrium that CP’s copyright pricing is related to 
user price sensitive coefficient, but has nothing to do with the service level sensitive 
coefficient. If users are more sensitive of music service level, OP’s service pricing, service 
level and user demand will be higher accordingly, as well as all participants in the 
channels. CP is taking the leading role in the channel, with almost twice the revenue of 
OP. If OP’s digital music service cost coefficient η increases, its pricing, service level, 
user demand and all the participants’ revenue will decrease. 
 
To explore OP’s service cost coefficientη ’s influence on the results of game equilibrium, 
set 20000=Bd , 1000=cc , 10=α , 15=β  for numerical analysis. 
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 Figure 13 Influence of η  on CP’s and OP’s 
pricing in High Copyright Price without SP 
Mode  
Figure 14 Influence of η  on participants’ and 
channel system’s revenues in High Copyright 
Price without SP Mode 
 
Figure 15 Influence of η  on OP’s service level in High Copyright Price without SP Mode 
 
From the above figures, CP’s copyright pricing is not influenced by OP’s service cost 
coefficient η . OP’s music service pricing , OP’s and SP’s revenues and channel 
system’s revenue increase with a decreasing speed as η  grows. Therefore, to maximum 
all the participants’ revenues,η ’s value should be reduced as much as possible. From the 
service level curve, the bigger OP’s service cost coefficient η is, the lower its service 
level is. 
op
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Figure 16 Influence ofα , β  on OP’s revenue Figure 17 Influence ofα , β  on channel 
system’s revenue 
To explore user price effect parameter α and service effect parameterβ ’s influence on 
the participants’ revenues, set dB = 20000 , cc =1000 , 10=α , 15=β  for numerical 
analysis. As CP’s revenue is twice as much as OP’s revenue, CP’s three-dimensional 
figure has the same trend with that of OP. From the above figures, it can be drawn that 
channel participants’ revenues increase with the growth of user service effect parameter
β . Therefore, innovating business model and improving user experience will bring a 
geometric growth to all the participants in the channels. User price effect parameterα ’s 
increase will lead to a decrease in all the participants’ revenues. 
  
Conclusion1: In a competitive High Copyright Price without SP Mode, 
- CP is taking the leading role in the channel, with almost twice the revenue of OP. 
- If OP’s digital music service cost coefficient η increases, its pricing, service level, user 
demand and all the participants’ revenue will decrease. However, η  doesn’t affect CP’s 
pricing. 
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- It’s user price effect parameterα not user service effect parameterβ  that influences 
CP’s pricing. If users are sensitive to digital music service level but not sensitive to digital 
music service price, participants’ and channel system’s revenues will all grow. Innovating 
business model and improving user experience will bring a geometric growth to all the 
participants in the channels. 
5.2.2 “Low Copyright Price + Revenue sharing” without SP Mode 
In this mode, CP sells its copyright at a relatively low price and then OP produce digital 
music service content for users. In the revenue obtained, OP distributes γ−1  of the 
revenue to CP according to a contract concluded in advance. In this case, CP will be faced 
with OP’s service level and user scale risks. Here, γ is assumed to be a known constant. 
Similar with High Copyright Price without SP Mode, the demand function is defined as 
  ooBo psdd ** αβ −+=    (5.10) 
Wherein Bd  denotes the basic user demand of digital music, andα , β  denote the 
effect parameter of price and service.  
 
OP’s revenue is γ  of its sales revenue minus copyright cost and digital music content 
production cost, namely: 
  oocooo cdpdp −−=Π γ   (5.11) 
Same with High Copyright Price without SP Mode, OP’s service cost is defined as: 
  2
2
o
o
sc η=
  (5.12) 
OP’s goal is to maximum its revenue by choosing proper music service level and price in 
the condition of co pp > , namely: 
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),(max ooopp spco
Π
>     (5.13) 
Above formula is taken derivative with respect to op   os  to obtain two 
simultaneous equations, which can be solved to achieve OP’s optimal price and service 
level: 
  
2
2
*
2 βαη
βαηη
−
−+
= ccBo
ppd
p
,
2
*
2 βαη
αββ
−
−
= cBo
pds
  (5.14) 
Then the above optimal price *op  is substituted into demand function od  to get the 
optimal sales volume: 
  
2
*
2
)(
βαη
ααη
−
−
= cBo
pdd
   (5.15) 
CP’s revenue function is its copyright revenue plus revenue sharing minus copyright cost: 
  oooccc dpdcp )1(*)( γ−+−=Π     (5.16) 
CP’s goal is to maximum its revenue by choosing proper music copyright price in the 
condition of co cp > , namely: 
  
)(max cccp pcc
Π
>    (5.17) 
*
op , do
*  are substituted into Πc , followed by taking derivative for Πc  to obtain the 
optimal copyright price: 
  )(2
)22(
2
222
*
αηγβγαηα
βγγβααγηηαγ
+−
−−+
= BcBcc
dcdc
p
  (5.18) 
Channel system’s revenue is: 
  co ∏+Π=∏   (5.19) 
Through the above calculation, the following equilibrium table can be drawn: 
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Table 8 Equilibrium results in “Low Copyright Price + Revenue sharing” without SP Mode 
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From Table 8, in “Low Copyright Price + Revenue sharing” without SP Mode, CP’s 
copyright pricing is related to both user price sensitive coefficient and service level 
sensitive coefficient. 
 
 
59 
 
   
Figure 18 Influence of η  on CP’s and OP’s 
pricing in“Low Copyright Price + Revenue 
sharing” without SP Mode 
Figure 19 Influence of η  on participants’ and 
channel system’s revenues in “Low Copyright 
Price + Revenue sharing” without SP Mode 
To explore OP’s service cost coefficientη ’s influence on the results of game equilibrium, 
set dB = 20000 , cc =1000 ,α =10 , β =15 , γ = 0.5  for numerical analysis. In “Low 
Copyright Price + Revenue sharing” without SP Mode, if η  grows, OP’s music service 
pricing , service level, participants’ revenue and channel system’s revenue will all 
decrease at a slowing down speed, whereas CP’s copyright pricing will increase. 
 
 
Figure 20 Influence of η  on OP’s service level 
in “Low Copyright Price + Revenue sharing” 
without SP Mode  
Figure 21 Influence of γ  on OP’s service level 
in “Low Copyright Price + Revenue sharing” 
without SP Mode 
To explore revenue sharing ratioγ ’s influence on the results of game equilibrium, set 
op
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dB = 20000 , cc =1000 ,α =10 , β =15 , 20=η  for numerical analysis. The results show, 
with the revenue sharing ratioγ ’s growth, OP’s service level, CP’s and OP’s pricing and 
revenue increase. Although most revenue is attributed to CP, OP is gaining its power in 
the channel withγ ’s growth. When γ =1  which means if CP and OP don’t share revenue, 
all the participants in the channels will maximum their revenue. This can explain the 
phenomenon that CP tends to price its copyright on high level and the revenue sharing 
part accounts for only a small part of its income. Another reason that CP prefers High 
Copyright Price without SP Mode is that in the revenue sharing mode, CP cannot know 
OP’s real sales because of the asymmetric information between CP and OP, resulting in 
OP’s moral hazard. Therefore, there is a need to design an incentive cooperation 
mechanism to motive both CP and OP to cooperate to achieve a win-win situation. 
   
Figure 22 Influence of γ  on CP’s and OP’s 
pricing in “Low Copyright Price + Revenue 
sharing” without SP Mode 
Figure 23 Influence of γ  on participants’ and 
channel system’s revenues in “Low Copyright 
Price + Revenue sharing” without SP Mode 
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Figure 24 Influence ofα , β  on OP’s revenue 
in “Low Copyright Price + Revenue sharing” 
without SP Mode   
Figure 25 Influence ofα , β  on channel 
system’s revenue in “Low Copyright Price + 
Revenue sharing” without SP Mode   
To explore user price effect parameter α and service effect parameter β ’s influence on 
the participants’ revenues, set dB = 20000 , cc =1000 , 20=η , 5.0=γ  for numerical 
analysis. It can be seen from Figure 24 and Figure 25 that, if CP and OP share revenue 
using split 50-50, CP will account for nearly all the revenue in the channel. Participants’ 
revenues increase with the growth of user service effect parameter β , whereas user price 
effect parameterα ’s increase will lead to a decrease in all the participants’ revenues. 
 
Conclusion2: In a competitive “Low Copyright Price + Revenue sharing” without SP 
Mode, 
- If OP’s digital music service cost coefficient η  increases, its pricing, service level, user 
demand and all the participants’ revenue will decrease, whereas CP’s pricing will increase 
on the contrary. 
- If CP and OP’s revenue sharing ratio γ  grows, OP’s service level, CP’s and OP’s 
pricing and revenue will all increase. CP’s revenue percentage in the channel system’s 
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revenue drops, whereas OP gains its power in the channel with γ ’s growth. When γ =1  
which means if CP and OP don’t share revenue, CP gets twice the revenue of OP and all 
the participants in the channels can maximum their revenue. 
- Participants’ revenues increase with the growth of user service effect parameter β , 
whereas user price effect parameterα ’s increase will lead to a decrease in all the 
participants’ revenues. If users are sensitive to digital music service level but not sensitive 
to digital music service price, participants’ and channel system’s revenues will all grow. 
5.2.3 Comparative Analysis of High Copyright Price without SP Mode and “Low 
Copyright Price + Revenue sharing” without SP Mode 
To help stakeholders in the digital music channels to gain a clear perspective about which 
mode to choose in the competitive situation, the similarities and differences are drawn to 
after comparative analysis in the table 9 below: 
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Table 9 Comparative analysis of High Copyright Price without SP Mode and “Low Copyright Price 
+ Revenue sharing” without SP Mode 
Differences 
High Copyright Price 
without SP Mode 
“Low Copyright Price + Revenue 
sharing” without SP Mode 
η  doesn’t affect CP’s 
pricing . 
CP’s pricing cp  increases with η ’s 
growth 
CP gets twice the revenue 
of OP 
If γ  grows, CP’s revenue percentage in 
the channel system’s revenue drops; 
When γ =1 , CP gets twice the revenue 
of OP 
β  doesn’t affect CP’s 
pricing . 
β  affects CP’s pricing 
 If CP and OP’s revenue sharing ratio γ  
grows, OP’s service level, CP’s and OP’s 
pricing and revenue will all increase. 
Similarities  
If OP’s digital music service cost coefficient η increases, its pricing, 
service level, user demand and all the participants’ revenue will 
decrease. 
If users are sensitive to digital music service level but not sensitive to 
digital music service price, participants’ and channel system’s revenues 
will all grow. 
5.3 Game Analysis on Digital Music Channels with SP’s Participation 
From the point of the whole digital music market, SP with a sensitive market sense and 
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professional digital music content production and marketing capability, has a more 
powerful ability to meet users demand compared with OP. Therefore, in this paper when 
SP participate into digital music channel, its service level is supposed to surpass OP’s 
service level, that is to say os ss > . If SP participate into the channel, OP serve as user 
service interface and SP produce digital music content and service whose service level 
affects user demand directly. In this section, considering SP’s service level and service 
cost, tripartite game equilibrium strategies are explored among CP, SP and OP. In the 
tripartite game, CP decide the music copyright price and then SP decide the service level 
and price selling to OP. After observing SP’s action, OP decide its pricing depending on 
user price and service effect parameter to achieve maximal profit. With SP’s participation, 
a tripartite dynamic game relation is formed in the channel and High Copyright Price with 
SP Mode and “Low Copyright Price + Revenue sharing” with SP Mode are explored in 
this section.  
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Figure 26 Channel Structure Diagram of CP, SP and OP participating into channel 
5.3.1 High Copyright Price with SP Mode 
In High Copyright Price with SP Mode, CP sell music copyright to SP at a high price and 
then SP choose the service level and service pricing selling to OP basing on user service 
level affect parameter and copyright price. OP deliver the digital music service at a price 
which is affected by user price affect parameter. In this section, a three-stage Stackelberg 
game model (Zhang Weiying, 1996, pp. 107-137) is established and backward induction 
approach is used to solve the Nash equilibrium solution. 
 
As High Copyright Price without SP Mode, digital music service demand function is 
defined as a function of a leaner relationship with price and service level. So user demand 
od
od
op
cp odcc
ss , sp  , sc  
Content Providers 
CP Π  
Service Providers 
SP sΠ  
Telecom Operators 
OP oΠ  
Users ss , od  
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is defined as below: 
  osBo psdd ** αβ −+=   (5.20) 
OP’s revenue is its sales revenue minus digital music content cost bought from SP, namely: 
  osoo dpp *)( −=Π   (5.21) 
OP’s goal is to maximum its revenue by choosing proper music service price in the 
condition of so pp > , namely: 
  
)(max oopp pso
Π
>   (5.22) 
Above formula is taken derivative with respect to op  to obtain a simultaneous equation, 
which can be solved to achieve OP’s optimal price: 
  α
βα
2
* ssB
o
spdp ++=
  (5.23) 
Then the above optimal price *op  is substituted into demand function od  to get the 
optimal sales volume: 
  
)(
2
1*
ssBo psdd αβ −+=
  (5.24) 
SP’s revenue function is sales revenue minus copyright cost and digital music production 
cost: 
  socss cdpp −−=Π )(   (5.25) 
σ , as a known constant, is assumed as SP’s digital music production costs affect 
parameter. SP’s service cost and service level are in line with the function:  
  2
2
s
s
s
c σ=
   (5.26) 
SP’s goal is to maximum its revenue by choosing proper digital music service level and 
price selling to OP in the condition of os pp >  
  
),(max ssspp spcs
Π
>    (5.27) 
*
od  is substituted into sΠ , followed by taking derivative for sΠ  to obtain the optimal 
digital music content selling price and service level: 
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  (5.28) 
Above formula are substituted into *od : 
  
2
*
4
)(
βασ
αασ
−
−
= cBo
pdd   (5.29) 
CP’s revenue function is: 
  occc dcp )( −=Π   (5.30) 
CP’s goal is to maximum its revenue by choosing proper music copyright price in the 
condition of co cp > , namely: 
  )(max cccp pcc
Π
>
  (5.31) 
*
od is substituted into , followed by taking derivative to obtain the optimal copyright 
price: 
  
α
α
2
* cB
c
cdp +=    (5.32)
  
Channel system’s revenue is: 
  osc Π+Π+Π=Π   (5.33)
  
Through the above calculation, the following equilibrium table can be drawn: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Πc
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Table 5.5 Equilibrium Results in High Copyright Price with SP Mode 
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From the equilibrium results in Table 5.5, SP’s digital music service cost coefficient  
and user service effect parameter β  cannot affect CP’s pricing. CP gets twice the revenue 
of OP.  
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Figure 27 Influence of σ  on CP’s, SP’s and 
OP’s pricing in High Copyright Price with SP 
Mode   
Figure 28 Influence of σ  on OP’s service 
level in High Copyright Price with SP Mode 
To explore SP’s service cost coefficient σ ’s influence on the results of game equilibrium, 
set 20000=Bd , 1000=cc , 10=α , 15=β  for numerical analysis. If SP’s digital music 
service cost coefficient σ increases, its pricing, service level ss , OP’s pricing, user 
demand and all the participants’ revenue will decrease, whereas σ  doesn’t affect CP’s 
pricing. When σ  gets a small value,  cp  is far less than op  and sp , and OP takes 
most of all the revenue in the channel. OP’s revenue drops rapidly, becoming the least 
revenue gainer in the channel with σ ’s growth, whereas CP gets most revenue. 
 
Figure 29 Influence of σ  on participants’ and channel system’s revenues in High Copyright Price 
with SP Mode 
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Figure 30 Influence ofα , β  on CP’s revenue 
in High Copyright Price with SP Mode 
Figure 31 Influence ofα , β  on channel 
system’s revenue in High Copyright Price with 
SP Mode 
To explore user price effect parameter α and service effect parameterβ ’s influence on 
the results of game equilibrium, set 20000=Bd , 1000=cc ,  for numerical 
analysis. Consistent with High Copyright Price without SP Mode, if users are sensitive to 
digital music service level but not sensitive to digital music service price, participants’ 
and channel system’s revenues will all grow. 
 
Conclusion3: In a competitive High Copyright Price with SP Mode, 
- CP is taking the leading role in the channel, with twice the revenue of OP.  and β  
doesn’t affect CP’s pricing. 
- If SP’s digital music service cost coefficient  increases, its pricing, service level , 
OP’s pricing, user demand and all the participants’ revenue will decrease. OP’s revenue 
drops rapidly, becoming the least revenue gainer in the channel with ’s growth, whereas 
CP gets most revenue. 
- If users are sensitive to digital music service level but not sensitive to digital music 
10=σ
σ
σ ss
σ
71 
 
service price, participants’ and channel system’s revenues will all grow.  
5.3.2 “Low Copyright Price + Revenue sharing” with SP Mode 
In “Low Copyright Price + Revenue sharing” with SP Mode, CP sell the copyright to SP 
at a relatively low price, and then SP choose service level and service pricing selling to 
OP basing on user service level affect parameter and copyright price. OP deliver the 
digital music service at a price affected by user price affect parameter. OP get  of the 
revenue obtained and distribute  of it to SP while  to CP according to a 
contract concluded in advance. Here,  and  are assumed to be known constants, and 
the demand function is defined as 
  osBo psdd ** αβ −+=    (5.34) 
OP’s revenue is  of its sales revenue minus digital music content cost, namely: 
  osoo dpp *)( −=Π δ   (5.35) 
SP’s revenue is sum of revenue of digital music content selling to OP and  of the 
revenue obtained minus copyright cost and digital music content production cost, namely: 
  ososocss dppcdpp )()( −+−−=Π µ   (5.36) 
SP’s service cost is defined as: 
  2
2
s
s
sc σ=
   (5.37) 
CP’s revenue function is its copyright revenue plus revenue sharing minus copyright cost: 
  osooccc dppdcp ))(1()( −−−+−=Π µδ    (5.38) 
Similar with Stackelberg game analysis without SP’s participation, CP’s optimal 
copyright price: 
δ
µ µδ −−1
δ µ
δ
µ
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Channel system’s revenue is: 
  osc Π+Π+Π=Π    (5.40) 
Through the above calculation, following equilibrium table can be drawn: 
 
Table 10 Equilibrium results in“Low Copyright Price + Revenue sharing” without SP Mode 
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 Figure 32 Influence of  on CP’s, SP’s and 
OP’s pricing in“Low Copyright Price + 
Revenue sharing” with SP Mode   
Figure 33 Influence of  on SP’s service level 
in“Low Copyright Price + Revenue sharing” 
with SP Mode 
 
 
Figure 34 Influence of  on participants’ and channel system’s revenues in“Low Copyright Price 
+ Revenue sharing” with SP Mode  
To explore SP’s service cost coefficient ’s influence on the results of game equilibrium, 
set , , , , ,  for numerical analysis. In 
“Low Copyright Price + Revenue sharing” with SP Mode, if  grows, SP’s and OP’s 
music service pricing, service level, participants’ revenue and channel system’s revenue 
σ σ
σ
σ
20000=Bd 1000=cc 10=α 15=β 3.0=δ 3.0=µ
σ
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will all decrease at a slowing down speed, whereas CP’s copyright pricing will increase 
and gradually level off. Consistent with the High Copyright Price with SP Mode, when 
σ  gets a small value,  cp  is far less than op  and sp , and OP take most of all the 
revenue in the channel. OP’s revenue drops rapidly, becoming the least revenue gainer in 
the channel with σ ’s growth, whereas CP get most revenue. The quantitative outcomes 
are in conformity with China digital music market situation—— CP and OP dominate the 
channel and SP is losing its channel power. 
 
      
 Figure 35 Influence ofα , β  on OP’s 
revenue in “Low Copyright Price + Revenue 
sharing” with SP Mode  
Figure 36 Influence ofα , β  on channel 
system’s revenue in “Low Copyright Price + 
Revenue sharing” with SP Mode   
To explore user price effect parameter α and service effect parameterβ ’s influence on 
the participants’ revenues, set , , , ,   for 
numerical analysis. It can be seen that CP will account for the nearly all the revenue in 
the channel. Participants’ revenues increase with the growth of user service effect 
parameterβ , whereas user price effect parameterα ’s increase will lead to a decrease in 
all the participants’ revenues. 
20000=Bd 1000=cc 10=σ 3.0=δ 3.0=µ
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 Figure 37 Influence of , on SP’s revenue 
in “Low Copyright Price + Revenue sharing” 
with SP Mode 
Figure 38 Influence of , on channel 
system’s revenue in “Low Copyright Price + 
Revenue sharing” with SP Mode 
To explore revenue sharing ratio’s influence on the results of game equilibrium, set 
, , , ,  for numerical analysis. From Figure 37 
and Figure 38, SP’s revenue ratio accounts for the largest part, followed by OP’s revenue 
ratio. If CP doesn’t participate into revenue sharing, which mean , all the 
participants in the channels will maximum their revenue. 
 
Conclusion4: In a competitive “Low Copyright Price + Revenue sharing” with SP Mode, 
- If SP’s digital music service cost coefficient  increases, its pricing, service level , 
OP’s pricing, user demand and all the participants’ revenue will decrease, expect CP. OP’s 
revenue drops rapidly, becoming the least revenue gainer in the channel with ’s growth, 
whereas CP gets most revenue. 
- If users are sensitive to digital music service level but not sensitive to digital music 
service price, participants’ and channel system’s revenues will all grow.  
- If SP’s revenue ratio  accounts for the largest part, and CP don’t participate into 
revenue sharing, which means , all the participants in the channels will 
δ µ δ µ
20000=Bd 1000=cc 10=α 15=β 10=σ
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σ ss
σ
µ
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maximum their revenue. 
5.3.3 Comparative Analysis of High Copyright Price with SP Mode and “Low 
Copyright Price + Revenue sharing” with SP Mode 
To help stakeholders in the digital music channels to gain a clear perspective about which 
mode to choose in the competitive situation, the similarities and differences are drawn to 
after comparative analysis in table 11. 
 
Table 11 Comparative analysis of High Copyright Price with SP Mode and “Low Copyright Price + 
Revenue sharing” with SP Mode 
Differences 
High Copyright Price 
with SP Mode 
“Low Copyright Price + Revenue 
sharing” with SP Mode 
 doesn’t affect CP’s 
pricing . 
CP’s pricing  increases with ’s 
growth 
CP get twice the revenue of 
OP 
If  grows, CP’s revenue ratio in the 
channel system’s revenue drops. 
 doesn’t affect CP’s 
pricing . 
 affects CP’s pricing . 
 
 If  gets a big value and CP don’t 
participate into revenue sharing, which 
means , all the participants in 
the channels will maximum their revenue. 
Similarities  
If SP’s digital music service cost coefficient increases, its pricing, 
service level, and OP’s pricing, user demand and all the participants’ 
σ
cp
cp σ
σ
β
cp
β cp
µ
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σ
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revenue will decrease. 
If users are sensitive to digital music service level but not sensitive to 
digital music service price, participants’ and channel system’s revenues 
will all grow. 
 
5.4 Comparative Analysis of Four Competitive Digital Music Channel Mode 
It can be seen from the comparison of the four competitive channel modes that, if SP 
don’t join digital music channel, users can get higher service level in High Copyright 
Price mode than that in “Low Copyright Price + Revenue sharing” mode. On the contrary, 
if SP join digital music channel, service level is higher in “Low Copyright Price + 
Revenue sharing” mode than in High Copyright Price mode. Whether SP participates, all 
the participants’ revenue and channel system’s revenue is bigger in High Copyright Price 
mode than “Low Copyright Price + Revenue sharing” mode, which means it’s more 
profitable without participants’ revenue sharing. 
 
If SP’s service level and OP’s are not much different, which means OP’s service cost 
coefficient η  and SP’s service cost coefficient σ  are not much different, all the 
participants’ revenue and channel system’s revenue in the mode with SP are smaller than 
those without SP. If σ  is far less thanη , all the participants’ revenue and channel 
system’s revenue in the mode with SP are bigger than those without SP. Therefore, if η  
and σ  are not much different, OP and CP adopting High Copyright Price mode without 
SP is the optimal strategy, otherwise if σ  is far less than η , CP, SP and OP adopting 
High Copyright Price mode is the optimal strategy in the competitive channel. No matter 
whether SP participate into the channel, OP’s optimal pricing stays stable in High 
Copyright Price mode. 
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In sum, in the competitive digital music channel, if OP’s service cost coefficient η  is 
around SP’s service cost coefficient σ , OP buying music copyright from CP and 
producing digital music content can shorten channel length, which means less channel 
competition but lower service level than that in the mode with SP. Otherwise if σ  is far 
less than η , SP should participate into the channel and produce digital music content with 
higher service level. 
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6 DIGITAL MUSIC CHANNEL COOPERATIVE EQUILIBRIUM AND 
COORDINATION MECHANISM CONSTRUCTION 
As in competitive situations, channel participants CP, SP and OP compete with each other, 
resulting in channel revenue loss. To design a reasonable channel coordination 
mechanism, game equilibrium is explored in cooperative digital music channel. There are 
two cooperative modes— with SP’s participation and without SP’s participation.  
Considering digital music service production cost and service level, cooperative models 
are constructed to explore OP’s pricing, service level and channel system’s revenue. By 
comparing channel system revenue in cooperative modes and that in competitive modes, 
channel system’s revenue increase significantly in cooperation situation. Then a revenue 
sharing mechanism based on participants’ bargaining power is constructed in both of 
these two cooperative modes to achieve channel coordination in which channel 
participants’ revenue achieve optimization. 
6.1 Equilibrium of Cooperative Digital Music Channel Mode 
In cooperative situation, CP, SP and OP make joint decisions to achieve optimal channel 
system revenue. To find out the revenue loss in competitive digital music channel, 
equilibrium results in cooperative channel modes are explored. By comparing the 
competitive modes and cooperative modes, a reasonable channel coordination 
mechanism is in necessary to make all the participants achieve optimal revenue.  
6.1.1 Equilibrium in Cooperative Digital Music Channel without SP 
In both High Price without SP Mode and “Low Price+Shared Revenue” without SP Mode, 
CP and OP cooperate with each other to achieve optimal channel system revenue. 
Parameter settings in this chapter are consistent with those in last chapter. In cooperative 
situation without SP, channel system revenue is the sum of CP’s and OP’s revenue. Let 
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 denote CP’s music copyright unit cost. Let  denote the digital music service 
pricing set by both CP and OP selling to users.  is set to be digital music service 
demand and  is OP’s cost by providing digital music service. So channel system 
revenue is: 
   (6.1) 
Consistent with last chapter, digital music service demand function is defined as a 
function of a linear relationship with price and service level. Let Bd  denote the basic 
user demand of digital music. Let α  and β  denote the effect parameter of price and 
service. So user demand is defined as below: 
     (6.2) 
OP’s service cost and service level are in line with the following function: 
    (6.3) 
Wherein η  is a known constant that is shared by all the participants in the channel. OP 
and CP cooperate together to choose proper digital music service pricing  and service 
level os  for users. Their goal is to maximize channel system revenue, namely: 
     (6.4) 
Above formula is taken derivative with respect to op  and os  to obtain two simultaneous 
equations, which can be solved to achieve their optimal price and service level: 
  ,  
Through the above calculation, the following equilibrium table can be drawn: 
Table 12 Equilibrium results in cooperative digital music channel without SP 
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As in competitive digital music channel, revenue in high price mode is bigger than that 
in “Low Price+Shared Revenue” mode, here channel system revenue comparison is made 
between cooperative channel without SP mode and high price mode without SP. Let C 
denote cooperative channel and let N denote competitive channel. Therefore, in 
competitive situation, channel system revenue loss is: 
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6.1.2 Equilibrium in Cooperative Digital Music Channel with SP 
In the situation that SP participates into digital music channel, let sc  denote OP’s music 
copyright unit cost. Channel system revenue is the sum of CP’s, SP’s and OP’s revenue: 
  socosco cdcp −−=Π+∏+Π=∏ *)(   (6.5) 
Similarly, digital music service demand function is defined as a function of a linear 
relationship with price and service level. Let Bd  denote the basic user demand of digital 
music. Let α  and β  denote the effect parameter of price and service. So user demand 
is defined as below: 
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    (6.6) 
SP’s service cost and service level are in line with the following function: 
    (6.7) 
Wherein  is a known constant that is shared by all the participants in the channel. SP, 
OP and CP cooperate together to choose proper digital music service pricing op  and 
service level ss  for users. Their goal is to maximize channel system revenue, namely: 
    (6.8) 
Above formula is taken derivative with respect to op  and  to obtain two simultaneous 
equations, which can be solved to achieve their optimal price and service level: 
   ,  
Through the above calculation, the following equilibrium table can be drawn: 
Table 13 Equilibrium results in cooperative digital music channel with SP 
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With SP’s participating, here channel system revenue comparison is made between 
cooperative channel with SP mode and high price mode with SP. In competitive situation, 
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channel system revenue loss is: 
   
Comparing he equilibrium results in cooperative digital music channel without SP and 
those in cooperative digital music channel with SP, if OP’s service cost parameter is the 
same as SP’s, which means , channel system revenue, digital music service level, 
digital music service pricing and demand are similar. However, in fact SP gets a more 
professional digital music service capability and OP gets a higher digital music service 
cost parameter, which means . Therefore, with SP’s participating, users are able to 
acquire higher service level and channel system revenue is higher compared with the 
situation without SP’s participating.  
 
6.2 Construction of Digital Music Channel Coordination Mechanism 
Channel system gets bigger revenue in cooperative situation than that in competitive 
situation. However, because of asymmetric information, CP, SP and OP compete with 
each other to maximum their own revenue. Coordination mechanism can motivate CP, 
OP and SP to adopt cooperative strategies and achieve optimal channel revenue. In this 
section, digital music channel coordination mechanism is constructed basing on 
participant’s bargaining power to enable participants to formulate revenue sharing 
contracts to achieve channel coordination. 
 
From last chapter, in competitive situation, channel revenue in high price mode is bigger 
than that in “Low Price+Shared Revenue” mode. Therefore, in this section competitive 
high price mode is set as benchmark to consider the channel system revenue loss between 
competitive situation and cooperative situation. Let C denote cooperative channel and let 
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N denote competitive channel.  
6.2.1 Construction of Digital Music Channel Coordination Mechanism without SP 
In cooperative digital music channel without SP, CP and OP formula revenue sharing 
contract to share channel system revenue according to a ratio. As CP and OP have 
different channel control power, CP’s and OP’s bargaining power is set to measure their 
control power, which finally determines their revenue sharing ratio in the channel. 
In revenue sharing mechanism,  is cooperative channel system revenue. Let  
denote OP and CP’s revenue sharing ratio.  and  are CP’s and OP’s sharing 
revenue in the framework of revenue sharing mechanism. OP’s and CP’s revenue are as 
follows: 
     (6.9) 
    (6.10) 
 
To motivate CP and OP, CP’s and OP’s revenue should get bigger in revenue sharing than 
that without revenue sharing: 
  ,  
The sum of CP’s and OP’s bargaining power is assumed to quantify as 1. Let  
( ) denote OP’s bargaining power and let  denote CP’s bargaining power. 
A Nash bargaining model is constructed as follows: 
     (6.11) 
 
Above formula is taken derivative with respect to  to achieve OP and CP’s optimal 
revenue sharing ration: 
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Channel system revenue both in coordinate and non-coordinate situations is substituted 
into above formula: 
   
The ratio shows that, CP and OP’s revenue sharing ratio only has relation with CP’s and 
OP’s bargaining power. OP can get a bigger revenue sharing ratio with bigger bargaining 
power. 
 
To conclude, in the digital music channel without SP’s participation, if OP and CP formula 
revenue sharing contract according to a ratio of ,  both CP and OP will get 
optimal revenue. 
6.2.1 Construction of Digital Music Channel Coordination Mechanism with SP 
If SP participate into cooperative digital music channel, CP, SP and OP formula revenue 
sharing contract to share channel system revenue according to a ratio. Similarly, as CP, 
SP and OP have different channel control power, their bargaining power are set to measure 
their control power, which finally determines their revenue sharing ratio in the channel. 
 
In tripartite revenue sharing mechanism, let  and  denote the revenue sharing ratio 
between OP, SP and CP. OP’s, SP’s and CP’s revenue are as follows: 
     (6.12) 
   (6.13) 
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   (6.14) 
 
To motivate all the participants, CP’s, SP’s and OP’s revenue should get bigger in revenue 
sharing than that without revenue sharing: 
  , ,  
The sum of CP’s, SP’s and OP’s bargaining power is assumed to quantify as 1. Let  
( ) denote OP’s bargaining power and let  denote SP’s bargaining power.  So 
CP’s bargaining power is . A Nash bargaining model is constructed as follows: 
     (6.15) 
 
Above formula is taken derivative with respect to and  respectively to achieve OP, 
SP’s and CP’s optimal revenue sharing ration: 
   
  
Then channel system revenue both in coordinate and non-coordinate situations are 
substituted into above formula. 
 
To conclude, in the digital music channel with SP’s participation, if OP, SP and CP 
formula revenue sharing contract according to a ratio of and , they will all get 
optimal revenue, wherein: 
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7 CONCLUSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
7.1 Conclusion 
This study sets out two questions. The first one is how the participants compete in four 
different competitive channel modes, in which revenue and service level are influenced. 
To answer this question, four competitive channel game models are constructed to seek 
the equilibrium in competitive situations after qualitatively analyzing participants, service 
modes and channel modes in digital music market. The conclusions are drawn that 
whether SP participates or not, all the participants’ revenue and channel system’s revenue 
is bigger in High Copyright Price mode than “Low Copyright Price + Revenue sharing” 
mode, which means it’s more profitable without participants’ revenue sharing in 
competitive mode. But the service level varies a lot in different modes. If SP don’t join 
digital music channel, users can get higher service level in High Copyright Price mode 
than that in “Low Copyright Price + Revenue sharing” mode. On the contrary, if SP join 
digital music channel, service level is higher in “Low Copyright Price + Revenue sharing” 
mode than in High Copyright Price mode.  
 
The second question is how participants can optimize revenue in coordination rather than 
competition. To study channel coordination mechanism, equilibrium in two cooperative 
channel models are explored and revenue sharing mechanism is constructed basing on 
participants’ bargainning power. In the digital music channel without SP’s participation, 
if OP and CP formula revenue sharing contract according to a ratio of , both 
CP and OP will get optimal revenue. In the digital music channel with SP’s participation, 
if OP, SP and CP formula revenue sharing contract according to a ratio of and , they 
will all get optimal revenue, wherein: 
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7.2 Limitations and future research 
With the fast progressing of digital music business model innovation, new cooperative 
mode is continously in developing. There are still some limitations of this study, which 
need further research. 
 
(1)The uncertainty of user demand function 
In this paper, the demand function, which is linear to digital music service price and 
service level, is constructed basing on the demand characteristics of physical goods. The 
influence of uncertain demand on channel equilibrium is worthy studying. 
 
(2)More channel coordination mechanisim basing on different business models 
Revenue sharing mechanism is constructed basing on participants’ bargaining power in 
this paper. While with the business model innovation of participants, the channel control 
power among different participants is changing. Thus more proper channel coordination 
mechanisim is in necessary to research into to promote the digital music market 
development. 
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